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A STUDY OP THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN IRAN

Reza Assadi, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1982
Historically speaking, the Iranian power straggle is not new.
It is, however, the contemporary contest for power which is the focus
of this thesis.

This study analyzes the struggle for power precipi

tated hy the Iranian Revolution of 1979*

It integrates information

from a variety of sources, examines key conceptual schemes, major
theories of revolution, theories ahout Islamic Marxism, and describes
events which influenced various groups, organizations and individuals
in Iran to seek power for themselves.

A salient feature of the study

is an examination of Iranian communism.

Efforts are also made at

forecasting how the Iranian power struggle is likely to evolve.
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A STUDY

OF THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLE EOR POWER IN IR A N

Introduction
The struggle for political power in Iran was not resolved with
the Shah’s departure from the country in 1979* nor with his death
while in exile*

Although Ayatollah Khomeini and various elected and

appointed officials of the new Islamic Republic of Iran assumed control
of the political institutions throughout the country, this has not
dissuaded various groups, organizations, nor individuals from aban
doning their struggle for the political control of Iran.

Neither

a new constitution, frequent elections, numerous reforms, nor a new
name for the country have ended the power strife there.
In addition to the volatile domestic struggle for political con
trol in Iran, overt and covert external political pressures continue
to be exerted upon Iran by leaders from Western aligned countries,
Arab countries, as well as from countries in the communist bloc.
Trade embargo, sanctions, and embassy closings have not deterred
international efforts to gain control over Iran’s power in the Middle
East.
Political cartoonists tend to illustrate the Iranian political
power (UTftmmfl. as a chess match with the chess board set up with pieces
representing personalities of the Islamic Republic of Iran opposing
pieces of the various domestic opposition factions.

Yet, other

geopolitical chess matches depict Khomeini’s supporters defending
Iran against the top ranking leaders of foreign governments.

According

to the famous epic poet Eerdowsi (IOIO/1967), the game of chess like
1
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the struggle for political power is not new hut an old intriguing saga
in Iran which has remained part of the country's history and fate*
Despite the sustained usage of the word power in various publica
tions about Iran, there seems to be widespread disagreement among
authorities as how to define power.

Ebr example, Marvin Zonis (1971 *

p. 6) defined power as:
An interpersonal relationship such that the behavior of
one (or more) actor(s) alters the behavior of another
actor(s). The powerful in Iran are those individuals
whose behavior alter the widest scope of the largest
domain, that is, the widest range of behavior of the
largest set of persons within that society.
Bill and Leiden (1979) in their discussion about power in Iran
maintained that the term power referred to the personal ability to
shape and control the behavior of others.

In other words, power is

a unique type of behavior for individuals who dictate their demands
to others.
Marwah (1977» P« 34) taking a much broader view in defending
Iran's power in the Middle East region contended that power is a goal
to defend Iranian internal values and structures against involuntary
changes at the behest of internal and external adversaries.
Biere is no consensus among scholars and writers as how to sys
tematically measure power in Iran.

In some studies, analyses are made

of the performance of the Iranian political elite.
on Iran's economy as the index of power.

Still others rely

Tet others, measure power

in Iran in terms of Iran's military might in the Persian Gulf, and the
Middle Ehst.
Power experiences and expectations indigenous to Iranians tend to
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be different from power behavior standards in Western countries (West
wood, 1965; Ityler et al., 1978* Hofstede, 1980).

Jbr example, Bozeman

(i960; 1980) pointed out that some of the tenets of power implicit in
Western political ideologies are incompatable with Iran's history of
monolithic power.

James Bill (1982) agrees that there are subtle dif

ferences between Westerners and Iranians in the meanings and inter
pretation of power concepts as extremists, moderates, and liberals.
Besides the tenacious habit of many political analysts and writers
to assume that power concepts precisely and exactly transfer to the
Iranian social scene from other Western countries and Western tradi
tions, there is evidence of bias toward Iranian power behavior (Harris
& Moran, 1979» Hofstede, 1980).

Bill Moyers (1981) contends that

Iran's internal and external power struggles are baffling to Western
ers, primarily, because there is "cultural illiteracy", a lack of
awareness on behalf of the U.S. and other countries of the Iranian
perspective and values.

This illiteracy interferes with evaluating

and assessing how Iranians exercise and respond to power.
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979»
the power dichotomy formerly described in secular terms as the power
struggle between "legal" versus "illegal" has been re-classified as
the power struggle between Muslims versus infidels or pagans.

Chubin

(i960), Ihlk (1980), Baker (1981), and others maintain that the
internal power struggle in Iran consists of a pluralistic power triad
between the right, moderates, and the left.
There is a trend among writers, scholars, and political leaders
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to classify the Iranian opponents in the struggle for power by particu
lar colors.

The most popular color coding is black versus red.

Binder (1979) insisted that initially the power straggle in Iran was
a major conflict between the red, the black, and the red, white, and
blue.
Despite the efforts of the governmental leaders in Iran to
eliminate those who oppose the government in power, the opposition
groups continue to recruit members within the country and abroad.
The Iranian opposition groups tend to branch off and form new groups
on a regular basis (Nyrop, 1978? Halliday, 1979)*

toe struggle for

power in Iran has become a pluralistic tug-of-war with some of the
opposition factions on the side of the Islamic government while others
remain its adversary.
Scope
The purpose of this study is to examine the recent revolution in
Iran focusing upon the power politics prevalent during the pre-revolu
tionary, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary periods.

From the ex

ternal perception, mainly, from Western political analysis, the con
tention is that the revolution in Iran parallels, or, at least, is
analogous to past major revolutions such as in Bagland in 1620's, in
Prance in 1790's, and in Russia in 1917*

Erom the internal point of

view, the recent revolution is regarded as a unique Iranian revolution,
unlike any other in the world.

(Qie special prominence given the

Iranian people's uprising In 1978-79 to Iran is not surprising in
light of the fact that for several milleniums, generations of Iranians
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have been raised with the belief that accords superiority to their
cultural heritage and social achievements (Graham, 1979)*
Certainly, the revolution in 1978-79 is an unprecedented event
in Iran.

Although it is not the first revolution to take place there,

the recent one is an epic in terms of the power struggle between ex
tremists and moderates, its course, and the subsequent changes which
resulted from the toppling of the tyrannical and corrupt imperialconstitutional government and the severing of diplomatic relations
with the U.S. government.

Ibr the first time since the establishment

of the Iranian state, the ruhaniyyat. the Shiite clergy, have gained
absolute control in the governance of the country.
Numerous scholars and writers have examined the revolution in
Iran.

Their publications are helpful and informative} however, they

fail to present or include the Iranian perspective about the struggle
for power.

The principal goal of this study is to analyze the struggle

for power in Iran from the onset of the revolution to the 1982 phase
of the post-revolutionary period in Iran.
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CHAPTER I

PERSPECTIVES ON POWER
Scope
Besides the personal and scholastic disagreements regarding the
recent revolution in Iran and its aftermath, distinct differences can
he found with respect to perceptions about power in Iran.

The purpose

of this chapter is to review the major aspects of the conceptual schemes
which influence how Iranians react to power and struggle for it.
Power (Qpdrat)
Qpdrat is translated from Persian into English as the term power.
Long before western scholars, researchers, or political analysts formu
lated their operational definitions and theories about power, Iranians
syncretized notions about power, initially without the benefit of
Western advisors and research data.

Consequently, their theoretical

orientations about power differ from extant Western ideas (lyier, et
al., 1978» Hofstede, 1980; Assadi, 1981).
The pursuit of power and the ensuing struggle for it abounds in
the historical accounts of Iranian politics.

In this respect, the

contemporary struggles in Iran are not sui generis.

Fundamentally,

there is little difference between Iranians seeking to maintain their
power hold on Iran and those groups, organizations, and individuals
in the country who challenge it.

The only major differences cited

in reports are in the respective justifications Iranians make for actions

6
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and. policies.
Despite all the political literature and rhetoric about power
in Iran and elsewhere, there continues to be inextricable confusion
in the use of the concept power.

Power is not a chimerical notion;

however, the term power has the long tradition of usage as a norm
ative notion.

Die various prescriptive statements about power tend

to be meaningful and inseparable from the given situation.

In a

particular setting, power is being evaluated in terms of relevancy
or appropriateness (Reynolds, 1981).
The ambiguity and ambivalence surrounding the concept power are
due in part to the tendency for writers and commentators to equate
the concept power to other conceptual categories such as influence,
authority, control, force, success, and goal.

Furthermore, conceptual

fallacies, ideological fantasies, and misconception also account for
misunderstandings about the concept power.
In his perusal of political literature, Charles Reynolds (1981)
concludes that all writers seem to consider power to be a form of
capacity or quality gained or lost.

Instead of trying to assess and

evaluate Iran's struggle for power with empirical statistical measures
and designs, a starting point for this study is to review the major
notions Iranians maintain about power.
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Power and Shiism
Generations of Iranians have "been, primarily, influenced by
theories and precepts about power which are deeply rooted in the
history and ideology of Shiite Islam, the official religion in Iran.
Fundamental to Shiism is the belief that temporal and divine power
are the same.

Instead of arbitrarily separating power into two major

task areas, power for religion and power over political matters and
specifying the limitations of both types of power, in Shiism, power
is a total capacity over all aspects of life from birth to death.
In Shiism, Allah is esteemed as the sole source of all power; and
this power is contingent upon Allah's will.

Furthermore, Allah has

delegated power to only a selected number of infallible agents, namely,
the Prophet, a dozen imams, and four specified substitutes for the
twelfth imam.
Although Allah's surrogates have been entrusted with legitimate
power, Iran's history amplifies the fact that only various temporal
rulers have monopolized power in governing the country, not any of
the divine agents.

Yet, the divine agents have left an influential

legacy of theories and principles pertaining to power which serve as
the basis of doctrinal and ideological motives for Shiite Muslims.
Part of the legacy of Allah's agents is the contention that all
secular leaders and ruling parties in Iran are illegitimate and in
volved in usurpation. There is actually no justification in the
Islamic tenets that makes such a categorical statement that temporal
power is illegitimate (Arjomand, 1979? Akhavi, 1980).

Secular rulers

in Iran have tended to base their claims to power on their personal
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power or military power rather than on claims of lineage or legitimacy
(Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).

Nevertheless, the illegitimacy principle has

served to justify acts of defiance and insurrection of Shiite Muslims
against rulers in Iran.

In addition, this principle conveniently

served to validate the fact that an Islamic government system is the
only legal one, not any monarchy, or a democratic type of government.
Die hostility of the Shiite Muslims toward secular rule is also
inextricably linked to their controversial and mystical convictions
about imams T The majority of Iranian Muslims profess the belief in
the divine power of twelve imams.

Belief in the imamat as successors

to the prophet constitutes one of the five principles of Shiism.

The

functions of imams also distinguishes the Shiite perspective from the
Sunni (Tabatabai, 1975? Jafari, 1979)* According to Shiism, a dozen
infallible, hand-picked males served as legitimate rulers.

Those who

believe in twelve imams are referred to as esna-ashaeri Shiites.
Shiites maintain the belief that Ali was the first true imam and the
rightful successor to the prophet.

Hence Ali’s lineage is considered

to be the legal one for subsequent imams.
Over a millenium ago, Mohammad Mehdi, the Twelfth Imam, thwarted
plans to end his presence by going into hiding; at that time, he was
nearly five years of age.
behalf.

Ibur successive agents served on the imam 's

Afterwards, no other substitutes were appointed to guard the

imam's interests.

His disappearance marks the end of the Shiite imamat;

however, it does not symbolize the termination or relinquishment of
the tarn's power.

Shiites argue that Imam Mehdi (imam zaeman or ghaeb)

exists and he is the only one with the divine rights to exercise
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legitimate power and all other leaders who try to act as a substitute
for the Twelfth Imam are usurpers.
In the absence of the Twelfth Imam, most Shiites believe that
certain legal experts have specific duties to prevent Islam from
falling into decline and abeyance.

The faaih. the foremost religious

expert, is to serve as judge and leader of the Shiite community.
Specifically, faqih provides guidance and leadership with respect
to the laws, judicial procedures, and institutions of Islam.

According

to Ayatollah Khomeini, the life-long faqih in Iran, all laws relating
to government devolve upon the faoih.
Besides the faoih. mujtahid is another authority on divine laws.
The mujtahid*s role in the Shiite community is to offer opinions by
his deductions of the provisions of Islamic laws, its principles, and
ordinances (Christopher, 1972).

There are also other titles for

the religious scholars of lesser rank.
preservation of Islam.

Each scholar is vital for the

Recently the ruhaniwat. the Shiite clerics

in Iran obtained their political primacy in the country.

They serve

as members of the mailis. and hold top government positions in Iran.
They claim that they are fulfilling their religious duties in main
taining the power in Iran in anticipation of the Twelfth Imam's re
turn.
Another part of the Islamic legacy pertains to martyrdom.

In

the seventh century, Imam Hussein, the third Imam, was brutally
tortured to death by supporters of Caliph Yazid at Karbala.

At that

time, Imam Hussein had instigated an armed attack against the caliph.
Shiite Muslims have not dismissed the Imam's demise as a mere atrocity
perpetrated by a tyranntical and unjust ruler.

His death is emotion
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ally commemorated— 'the tenth day of Muharram— a major Shiite holiday.
Imam's defiance is traditionally perceived as the ultimate conflict
by Muslims— the just versus the unjust,

While the secular ruler and

his supporters may have succeeded in sapping the life of one of
Allah's agents and countless other Shiite adherents, the rulers in
Iran have failed to extinguish the spirit of the Shiite Muslims in
their quest to challenge tyranny,
Jmzun. Hussein's martyrdom symbolizes the inviolability of Islam
over secular absolutism.
Shiite Muslims,

Secular rulers have killed off numerous

Shiite Muslims, however, have transformed their

victims into divine martyrs,

Theoretically, the martyrdom phenomenon

has been a useful weapon to use against temporal rulers,

Shiite

Muslims who die while combating tyranny are believed to enjoy the
benefits of their hereafter and to be honored as fallen heroes.
It may bring one closer to an understanding about the power
phenomenon in Iran, if one examines the expression of power and the
related attitudes about this process.

A starting point is to trace

the development of the Shiite clerics' role in the Iranian society.
Although Mohammad, the Prophet, decredd in his teachings and revel
ations that there must be no intermediary between Allah and Muslims,
a distinct professional stratum of Islamic clergy known as ulama
(ulema) evolved.

In the seventh century A.D., following the death

of Mohammad, some of his cloae associates took on the task of codify
ing the fundamental tenets of Islam,

Initially, the Arab religious

scholars did not hold any claims to priestly powers nor authority
(Chrsitopher, 1912),

Upon completion of their codification, the
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Islamic clergy became entrenched in the countries where Sunni and
Shiite Islam prevailed.
Since its conception by some Arab laymen, the ulama have changed
extensively (Keddie, 1981).

In the early part of the sixteenth

century, significant changes occurred with the ulama. At that time,
the Safavid ruler established Shiism (with the creed for twelve imams)
as the official state religion.
were greatly modified.

Consequently, the clerical ranks

The clerics no longer were exclusively com

prised of Arabs or Sunnis.

Besides the ethnic changes, the Shiite

clerics in Iran evolved their own corporate identify, complexity,
autonomy, and integration as a social force (Smith, 1970)*
It is relevant to note that the Shiite clergy in Iran comprise
one of the most influential minorities in the country.

This minority,

exclusively male, is a cadre of some activists who are unalterably
hostile to Iranian rulers as well as foreigners.
is the common name for the Shiite clergy in Iran.

The Ruhaniyyat
The Shiite clerics

also manage an extensive informal network and linkages in the Iranian
society and throughout the Shiite communisty.

Concensus among the

peers and the community of believers is decisive in determining
whether a cleric member attains any of the fifty ranks in the
ruVianiwat infrastructure.

The top position of the Shiite clergy is

that of imam or ayatollah.

In Iran, the clerics receive their

economic support from the Shiite community.

Besides their own

valuable religious property, they rely upon gifts, religious taxes
and obligations.
Unlike the Sunni clergy who are hired and paid by the state to
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perform religious duties, Shiite clerics, at least in theory, maintained
their independency from the secular ruler in the country.

However,

during the Shah's reign, the clerics did receive an income allowance
from the imperial government which ha. adjusted according to his
whims (Rubin, I960; Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).

Power and Pre-Islamic Notions
Besides the religious notions about power, Iranians also have
their share of secular traditions which evolved during pre-Islamic
times.

Nor example, Iranian poetry, literature, and history include

accounts of the powerful figures in Iran, the kings who ruled the
country.

Their power has been, mainly, negative power (Ledeen &

Lewis, 1981),

In other words, the various secular rulers in Iran

have exercised plenary power to prevent nearly every action which
they did not approve of.
The majority of Iranians tend to regard Iran's kings as legendary
figures not just mortals serving as top government leaders in the
country.

Iranians seem to believe that Iranian monarchs are endowed

with quasi-mystical charisma and power.

Iran's kings have also pro

pagated this notion by distinguishing themselves with regal symbols,
opulence, and building up the military might of the country.

It is

not happenchance that remnants of the images of Iran's kings are
preserved or are frequently the targets of malicious damage.

The

pre-Islamic history of Iran contains numerous accounts of the
Iranian people staging resistance against despotic rulers in their
country.
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It is relevant to reiterate that Iranian monarchs have served as
the linchpin for Iran.

To keep order in the country, Iran's kings

have not traditionally relied upon democratic means such as elections
or rule by concensus.

Iran's kings favored a centralized governance

system concentrating the power and decision making.

Although Iran

has a consitutional governments, the rulers in the country tend to
regulate all the branches of government.
In addition to having plenary power, the kings in Iran tend not
to change the basic structure of the Iranian soceity.

Ebr example,

the Shah instigated plans to develop a professional class of techno
crats in Iran but they were never given any power or any say in the
kingfs use of power.

Iranian society tends to be vertically structured.

The elite in the country have the privileges in the country and the
majority of Iranians in the other straturns of Iran are kept powerless,
poor, and illiterate (Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
It is significant to mention that Iran's kings have capitalized
upon the uncertainty,and insecurity of the Iranian people.

Monarchs

in Iran tend to maintain their power by keeping the masses fearful
of opposition groups and organizations or individuals who profess
a better order for the country.

The fear among Iranians, thus,

strengthens the dependency relationship between the king and the
people.
Although Iranian rulers have the wherewithal to exert power,
there are times when they avoid using their power.

Implicit in

such avoidance behavior is the notion that the ruler must first
save his face and preserve his clout among subjects rather than
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making any unpopular decisions.

As Pierre Salinger (1981) mentions,

U.S. officials were frustrated and baffled by the avoidance behavior
of those in power in Iran.

Instead of chancing public rejection

because of a decision, Iranian leaders who have power will simply
avoid the matter.
Another common notion about power in Iran is that power involves
risks.

Although Iran's rulers enforced strict laws to regulate the

behavior of the masses, opposition factions have no qualms in testing
the limits of the rulers' power. As is the case, many of Iran's rulers
have had their power removed by violence instigated by their subjects
(Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
One of the instruments of power in Iran is communication.

Ehch

of the rulers have maintained absolute control over the media services
in Iran and abroad.

Besides communication, Iran's rulers have kept

tight reigns on the military might in the country.
Power and Iranian Perspectives
The point that tends to be missed by many who analyze Iran's
problems with respect to power is which standards axe used to assess
how Iranians react to power and struggle for it.

Galtung (1979) pro

posed that perception figures significantly in the expectations and
role which a country has in the scheme of world politics.

Iran has

been viewing itself as the center and its neighbors, and other foreign
powers as the periphery.

This perceptual framework does not coincide

with the Western standards or that of the Soviet Union.
two super powers regard Iran as the periphery.

Bach of the

Iran is actually expected
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to help strengthen the hold of each super power at the center.
Before the Iranian Revolution, the Shah settled for being an
affiliate of the center (Ramazani, 1982).

His programs and projects

were designed to have Iran recognized as the important "fifth power"
in the world (Graham, 1979? Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).

He forged a power

role for Iran, one that would make the country the peace keeping
force in the Middle East.

Instead of pursuing the Shah's goals, the

Ayatollah Khomeini has focused upon making Iran the center for
religion and politics (Bill, 1982; Algar, 1981).
Summary
The key in understanding power in Iran is to remember that
Iranians have not had the various power experiences nor the same
conceptual schemes with respect to power as Westerners or the Soviets
have had.

Iranians have and maintain their own notions about power.
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CHAPTER I I

IRANIAN REVOLUTION THEORIES
Scope
Crane Brinton’s (1965) The Anatomy of Revolution has "been used
by contemporary writers to understand the recent revolution in Iran.
The Iranian people’s uprising in 1978-79 is not the first revolution
in the history of the country; however, it is an event which has
significantly affected the life of nearly all Iranians.

Chapter I

focused upon the major perceptions Iranians have regarding power.
This chapter will be devoted to the various revolutionary theories
Iranians used to justify their actions in straggling for power in Iran.

Major Differences
The ambitious task at hand is to analyze one of the major revolu
tions to have taken place in Iran.

As Crane Brinton (1965) pointed

out, there is a tendency to regard each and every revolution as a unique
one.

In the case of the Iranian Revolution of 1979* it is valid to

conclude that, in terms of the Iranian history, this revolution is
sui generis. lirst of all, it has received unprecedented publicity
throughout the world.

Initially, the Shah paid millions of dollars for

public relations campaigns to convince the world that his regime was
stable and popular, even capable of constraining the red and black
political opposition to his rule. Myriad publications about the revo
lution present different versions of why and how Iranians became involved
in their revolution to topple the imperial regime of the Shah.
17
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Besides being the top media event of the late 1970's, the recent
revolution in Iran is distinctly different from others in terms of
the types of communication technology used to disseminate all sorts
of propaganda within Iran and abroad,

Never before in the history

of Iran was such advanced communication technology available and
utilized to the extent it was used during the recent revolution.
Despite the strict censorship policies and physical risks, numerous
anti-government cassette tapes and publications were clandestinely
circulated throughout the country and abroad.

The various political

factions made the best use of bullhorns, microphones, walkie-talkies,
telephones, printing equipment, and other communication devises to
spread their opposition statements against the imperial regime.
In addition to the communication technology, the recent revolu
tion is significantly different from other revolutions in Iran because
of the number of participants taking part in the demonstrations and
protest gatherings.

On several occasions, there were reports that

nearly three million Iranians marched through the urban centers of
Iran.

This number is highly significant in terms of previous revolu

tions in Iran.

The guesstimates of Iranian protesters have not been

consistently accurate(ledeen & Lewis, 1981).

However, the recent

revolution has attracted on numerous occasions the largest number of
the citizenry from all levels of the society.
Another aspect which distinguishes the recent revolution from
others in Iran is the fact that political conscious Iranian women
donned their traditional Iranian covering, the chador, and headed
the processions of mourners and mass demonstrations.

The women
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did. not comprise the largest group of demonstrators; however, they
loudly chanted anti-government and anti-imperial slogans despite
the risks. Many Iranians were injured, imprisoned, tortured, and
yet others were added to the long list of revolutionary martyrs.
The Iranian women who joined the demonstrations did not represent
the feminist cause in Iran.

They belonged to various sisterhoods of

political factions in Iran.

Ashraf Dehghani, Ashraf Rabi'i (Bajavi),

and other Iranian women have had considerable influence in elevating
the political awareness of the Iranian masses about repression and
resistance “to tyranny (Keddie, 1980).
Another distinguishing feature of the recent revolution in Iran
is the coalition— the molticlass alliance which succeeded in toppling
the imperial regime.

Throughout the crucial stages of the revolution,

the Iranian demonstrators manifested universal enthusiasm, discipline,
cooperation, and commitment prevailed in Iran (Graham, 1979$ Keddie,
1981).

Although the revolutionary unity broke down soon after Ayatollah

Khomeini returned to Iran, the alliance of diverse political orienta
tion and interest comprised a total opposition to the regime.
Another unique aspect of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 is
the fact that during the whole revolution, Iranian Muslims continued
to observe their traditional religious celebrations.

The aforemen

tioned details and many others substantiate -that the recent revolution
is significantly different from other revolutions in Iran.
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Iranian Revolution I
According to Ayatollah Khomeini two revolutions have recently
occurred in Iran.

The Iranian Revolution I includes all the pre

revolutionary activities up to the establishment of the provisional
government headed by Mr. Mehdi Bazargan.

The Iranian Revolution H

began after the seizure of the American hostages and the end of the
Bazargan government.

The dual nature of the recent revolution has

beat been described as the revolution against the Shah's despotism
and a revolution against "American imperialism— U.S. involvement
in Iran" (Rouleau, 1979)*
Iranian Revolution Theories
Disillusionment and discontent were pervasive throughout Iran
during the late 1970's.

The "isle of stability" which Jimmy Carter

believed to exist in the Middle East proved to be a myth.

As Keddie

(1981), Rouleau (1979)» and- others have pointed out, U.S. policy
makers were misled by Iranian officials that the Shah's government
was a popular and strong imperial rule. Western leaders tended to
ignore, or, at least, pay the slightest attention to the anti-govern
ment propaganda being disseminated by Iranian student groups living
abroad.
Prior to the revolution and for some time after Ayatollah
Khomeini assumed power in the country, various revolutionary theories
which served as the basis to justify the Iranian Revolution were
published by the various political factions vying for the power in
Iran.

The most favorite themes of the different revolutionary
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theories were:

oppression, tyranny, and foreign domination.

Each

theory rationalized that a better order was possible by means of
revolution.

The common contention of each theory was that the revolu

tion would facilitate matters in Iran, thus, enabling Iranians to re
organize and improve conditions in their country.
Monarchist Ideology Ifythology
A small minority of Iranians, primarily members of the Pahlavi
royal family, large land owners, former top government officials and
bureaucrats, and opportunists did not favor any sort of revolution to
topple the Shah's regime.

They favored the status quo in the country.

The monarchists considered the Shah to be the linchpin in Iran who was
able to preserve the myth of Iranian kings and maintain a semblance
of order there.

The Shah had developed a vertical infrastructure in

Iran with a small
ical power in

coterie of elite controlling the

economicand polit

the country, leaving the majority of

Iranianspowerless,

illiterate, and poor (Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
The monarchists favored staging pro-Shah demonstrations to violent
ly counteract

the political opposition in Iran and

abroad.At the time

that the Shah

and his family departed from Iran for a respite, many

of the monarchists fearing for their lives relocated elsewhere in the
world.

They certainly had the wealth and connections abroad to insure

a comfortable stay in exile.
After the Shah's death, Iranian monarchists shifted their support
to the Shah's oldest son, Reza.

While living in exile in Egypt, Reza

Pahlavi performed the ceremony of crowning himself as the ruler of Iran
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in absentia.

So far, the Monarchists have been involved in dis

seminating information with their newspapers throughout the world.
They stress the past achievements of the Pahlavi rule and the crimes
committed by the Islamic Regime.
On April 12, 1982 Sadeq Ghotbzadeh was arrested in Tehran on
charges that he was conspiring with the Monarchists to assassinate
Ayatollah Khomeini.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh who had served as Ayatollah

Khomeini's assistant in Paris and as foreign minister of the Islamic
Republic had extensive connections with top ranking communist of
ficials throughout the world.

His arrest is not the first of its

kind linking Iranians and Monarchists to plotting the overthrow of
the current regime.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh has been imprisoned on numerous

charges since the Ayatollah Khomeini gained power in Iran. Moreover
Mr. Ghotbzadeh has been labeled as an "opportunist" seizing whatever
chance seems most attractive at the moment (Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
So far the Monarchists have not staged their counterrevolution
to re-establish Pahlavi rule in Iran.

They still believe that a

king should rule Iran and Iranians should be the loyal subjects,
dheir theoretical basis for a revolution is that it would help to
bring Reza Shah to power and preserve Iran's pre-Islamic traditions
of governance.
Shiite Ideology
Ibr centuries Shiite clerics and devoted Muslims have adhered
to the belief that Islam is the only legitimate life style.

The

teachings and tenets of Islam specify that Muslims have a duty to
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end oppression, tyranny, and protect the Shiite community from nonMuslinm.

The various Koranic suras and guidelines used to justify

Muslim involvement in the recent Iranian Revolution were not new
teachings but part of an anciet Islamic tradition.

By substituting

the names of the contemporary oppressors, the Shiite clerics in Iran
were able to use the fundamental teachings of Islam to direct the
Iranian Muslims to overthrow the imperial regime.
Besides blaming the Shah and his cohorts, the clerics sustained
negative sentiment toward foreigners, particularly, Americans,

U.S.

leaders were accused of crimes against the Iranian masses and for all
the domestic trouble in Iran.

After consolidating their hold on the

power in Iran, the religious leaders resorted to using Americans as
scapegoats for any problems or challenges the clerics encountered.
Of all the revolutionary theories, Shiism had the most credibility
among the masses.

lirst of all many Iranians were suspicious of the

left and their armed resistance.

The majority of Iranians who joined

the demonstrations were Shiite Muslims who naively listened to the
instructions and guidelines of the Shiite clerics.

Ibr many Iranians

caught up in the confrontations against the security forces, they
were fulfilling their Islamic duty in resisting tyrannical rule.

The

pre-revolutionary conditions in Iran significantly affected the
morale and well-being of nearly every Iranian.

Initially their re

actions to the stimulus of repression was passive then became more
violent.

Shiism was considered as the panacea for the couiitry's

conditions and problems.
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The Mojahedin Ideology
In 1963» a group from the National Pront "broke away and estab
lished the Liberation Movement of Iran (ITehzat-e Azadi-ve Iran).
In 1965 Said Mohsen and Ali-asghar-e Badi'zadegan broke away from
the Liberation Movement of Iran and along with Hanif-Nejad founded
the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOl).
Prom the outset, the Mojahedin were involved in Guerrilla activ
ities fighting against tyranny and reaction.

Since their ideology

was based on Islam, they justified their guerrilla activities in terms
of the Koran. The Mojahedin strive for the establishment of Jameay-e
Touhidi (Divinely Integrated Society) in which there is no exploitation
of man by man and no class distinctions.
To achieve their goals, besides being inspired by Islamic precepts,
the members of the Mojahedin Organization have studied Marxism-Leninism
and try to apply its practical aspects.

Peykar(Peykar daer rahe azady-e

taebeghy-e kargaer) that branched off from the Mojahedin Organization
in 1975 advocates Marxist ideology and also armed resistance.
The Ihdaeyoon Ideology
One of the major leftist organizations in Iran is the Marxist
Ihdaeyoon Guerrillas,

The first nucleus of this organization was

formed in 1965 by Bijan Jazani.

Besides this group, several other

Marxist groups were involved in theorizing about the Iranian Revolution
in the late 1960's.

Although Jazani was arrested by SAVAK and imprisoned,

his gr-up survived and in 1970 it formed a coalition with Safai Ibrahani
and Ahmadzadeh and his cohorts— 4ieftahi and Puyan.

They all came to the
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conclusion that urban and rural guerrilla war against the Shah's regime
was inevitable.

After much preparation, in February, 1971» a- group

under the command of Safai Farahani (Janaal group) attacked a rural
police headquarter in Siahkal (in the northern Province of Gilan)
and seized all of its weapons.

This group was later on crushed by

the army and other security forces.

In addition to this group, most

of the urban guerrillas, before gaining a major military victory,
were arrested and later on killed.
Siahkal, although a military defeat, was a very important politi
cal victory for the guerrillas.

It was the beginning of armed struggle

and the formation of the Organization of the Iranian People’s Fedayee
Guerrillas. Many revolutionary groups joined the organization after
the political victory in Siahkal.
The communist movement attracted many of the Iranian youths and
the Ihdaeyoon Organization started to grow.

It was in early 1979 "that

Ashraf-e Dehghani, an influential member, broke away from the organiza
tion.

She formed her own organization under the same name-— the Organi

zation of the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerrillas. Ashraf-e Dehghani
adopted Ahmad Zadeh's theories of revolution while the main organiza
tion had adopted Jazani's.

The former group believed in armed struggle

against the Khomeini's regime while the latter concluded that the petitbourgeois ruling class will safeguard the national interests.
The Fedayoon Organization suffered another split after Ashraf-e
Dehghani broke away from it.

In 1980 the organization branched off

into Aksaerevaet (Majority), and Aqaeleyaet (Minority). Aksaereyaet.
in turn, branched off into Jenah-e Hast (Bight Wing) and Jenah-e Chap
(Left Wing). The Bight Wing of Akseareyaet along with the Tudeh Party
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are staunch supporters of Khomeini's policies.
The Tudeh Party Ideology
The Tudeh (Mass) Party, a pro-Moscow communist party, was founded
in 1941•

It was a major opposition force in 1950's and 1960's.

In

the late 1960*s, -the Tudeh Party was inactive and many of the members
branched off and formed their own groups.

Because of its opportunistic

nature, the TUdeh Party has been labeled "Hezb-e Khaen-e Tudeh” (the
Traitor Tudeh Party) by its opponents.
A source of controversy within the Tudeh Party has been its strong
ties with the Soviet Union.

Besides close alignment with the Soviet

Union, the Party has close ties with the Shiite clerics, especially with
Mr. Khamenei, the current President of Iran.

The members of the party

have managed to infiltrate various government positions; have made an
alliance with Aksaereyaet; and plan to govern Iran after the death of
Ayatatollah Khomeini.
Liberal and Moderate Ideology
Opponents to the Shah who did not advocate armed resistance but
favored peaceful change were the Iranian liberals and moderates.

They

demanded an end to the corruption and oppression by asking for more
reforms.

Although they did not instigate a major protest against the

monarchy, they joined the coalition and participated in the formation
of the Bazargan government as well as the establishment of the Islamic
Republic.
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Opportunist Ideology
There are some Iranians who were ambivalent towards the revolu
tion.

Once the revolution started many joined the Islamic bandwagon

showing themselves to be devoted Muslims.

TJndergirding their basic

ideology is the notion that it is best "to ride whichever donkey which
is giving rides."
Summary
These major ideologies about revolution in Iran are only a small
sample of the sentiments and opinions secretly and openly expressed
by Iranians living in Iran and abroad.
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CHAPTER I U

WHAT IS ISAMIC MARXISM?
During the early 1970's, the term "Islamic Marxism" was coined
and added to the international political vocabulary.

At the onset

of its usage, the semantic status of the "paradoxical and incongruous
sounding word "was pejorative as well as ambiguous (Kedourie, 1978,
p. 23) • Both Iranians and Western political commentators tended to
use the term to refer to various things such as a political philosophy
a phenomenon, a trend, and a formidable opposition force indigenous
to Iran. Various theories have been proposed to explain the concept
Islamic Marxism.

Because of the paucity of the analyses of Islamic

Marxism to date, it seems advisable to suggest a classification for
the extant theories (Note l).

A discussion will follow concerning

four major theories of Islamic Marxism:

the Barrier Theory, the

Affinity Theory, the Scapegoat Theory, and the Infiltration Theory
The Barrier Theory
The oldest among the theories of Islamic Marxism is the Barrier
Theory.

In the 1950's when the Barrier Theory was initially expounded

the term Islamic Marxism did not even exist, but the label "Muslim
Communists" had already been coined.

Contemporary proponents of the

Barrier Theory consider the term Islamic Marxism to be an absurdity—
a contradiction.

Kedourie (1978, p. 23) explained that the term

Islamic Marxism is just a "new guise for an old conflict" brewing
between Islam and Marxism in Iran for a long time.
Many writers consider the Barrier Theory to be a valid one.
28
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Barrier Theory proposed that Iranian Muslims by virtue of their re
ligion are immune to the ngodlessn ideology of communism (Halpem,
1963).

In 1948, the U.S. House Committee on ibreign Affairs concluded

that as long as Islam was strong in Iran, there would be no receptivity
to communist propaganda nor alignment with the communist bloc (Halpem,
1963).
Long before Soviet communist ideology was formulated, antagonism
prevailed between Muslims and Russians.

Hieir animosity developed,

initially, from major conflicts over external security of their respec
tive borders and over territorial expansion plans.

Religious ideology

did not constitute as a serious factor in their political disputes
until the sixteenth century.

As Muslims and Russians emerged as

significant political forces to be reckoned with, both were intent on
fulfilling their plans at the expense of the other.

Ibr centuries,

Sunni and Shiite Muslims have proven to be formidable adversaries de
priving Imperial Russians access to southern territories and seriously
undermining Russia's sphere of influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus,
and throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.
Imperial Russia's incessant propaganda stressing the importance
of Panslavism and Orthodox Christianity did not deter Islamic influence.
Even Imperial Russia's cries over Muslim hegemony, as in the case of
the Muslim conquest of Constantinople, the capital of Orthodox Christen
dom in 1453, did little to weaken the Islamic hold there.

To reduce

Muslim dominance, tsarist governments resorted to counterattacks,
espionage, persecution as well as formal and covert treaties.
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Despite efforts to gain control over the Muslims in the East,
Muslim warriors destroyed Russian military units, inflicted heavy
casualties and property losses, sabotaged Russia's invasion plans,
and set up clandestine organizations to resist the Russian government.
Muslim missionaries succeeded in winning over millions of converts
which posed a serious threat to Orthodox Christianity and to Russian
state control.

Veritable holy wars were also instigated by Islamic

leaders against Russian authorities.

Moreover, Islam was a unifying

ideology and a cultural bond for nomads and sedentary people for re
sisting Russian dominance (Allsworth, 1967)*
Instead of gaining the trust and cooperation of Muslims within
and beyond the borders of Russia, the ambivalent policies of the
tsars widened the schism between Muslims and Russians and escalated
their irreconcilable conflicts.

On one hand, the tsars tried to pro

scribe Islam in Russia by confiscating Muslim wealth and property, by
depriving them access to their traditional institutions, by regulating
their marriages, by controlling their travel and communication pri
vileges, and by resorting to genocide.
On the other hand, Russian officialdom supported Islamic pros
elytizing dn-ring the reign of Catherine II as a means to thwart Islam
ic opposition.

In the late nineteenth century, the Russian government

again had a change of heart toward Islam.

Fearing violent resistance

of Muslims in Russia, Russian officials enacted a noninterference
policy to deal with Muslims. Muslims were not drafted into Russian
military service; they were also exempted from educational programs;
excluded from top government positions; and denied a say in the land
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reform*

Prior to 1917» the tsars drastically charged their policies

toward Muslims.
The fluctuations in Russian policies toward Muslims was largely
due to ignorance about Islam*

Kevian princes, tsars, and the Bolsheviks

tended to regard Islam only as another type of organized religion, not
as a unique form of socialism (Allsworth, 1967)*

In their struggle

for territorial dominance, Imperial Russians were the least coneemed
about gleaning the intricate details of the socialism originally
developed by the Arabs.

The tsars were more preoccupied with physically

subduing the Islamic opposition, not understanding them*
At least, in principle, the Soviet communists who overthrew the
yoke of the tsar in 1917 were fully committed to an alliance with the
Muslims as a means to establish the communist party in Muslim domin
ated countries*

The Soviet propaganda repeatedly stressed that Moscow

was the Mecca and Medina for all Muslims oppressed by imperialist
powers (Spector, 1959)*

Their implicit motive behind the token good

will gestures to the Muslims was to thwart any plans that the capital
ist countries had for an encirclement of the Soviet Union using the
Eastern countries (Lenczowski, 1980)*
Despite the friendly overtures extended to the Sunni and Shiite
Muslims, the Soviet communists also voiced their strong opposition to
Islam*

Islam represented a major barrier to the Soviet plans to

communize the East.

Numerous communist scholars and analysts have

scrutinized the origin of Islam and studied its precepts and customs.
Various theories have been disseminated by the communists refuting
Islam as a tool of capitalism and feudalism.

Some theorists insist

that Mohammad has been a mythical personality and Islam is just an
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ancient escapist ideology.

Fundamental to each theory which the com

munists have developed about Islam is the conclusion that Islam is
not in accordance with Marxist doctrine.
The Soviet communist anti-religious propaganda appalled Iranian
Muslims.

Having been nurtured with Islam, Iranian Muslims have been

suspicious of the communists and their ideologies.

Since the six

teenth century, Shiism has been the state religion in Iran and the
first ideology which generations of Iranians have been exposed to.
The physical environment in Iran has been saturated with symbols and
reminders of Islam.

Shiism is propagated in Iran, while Marxism is

banned as illegal and vehemently renounced as foreign paganism.
However, some Iranians, Muslims and non-Muslims, learn about Marxism
second hand from sources such as underground literature, clandestine
communist broadcasts, or through private discussions (Halpem, 19^3)•
In comparing Islam and Marxism, numerous scholars and political
analysts concur that Islam and Marxism are irreconcilable dogmas.

As

Lewis (1964) pointed out, Marxism is an atheistic philosophy— it is
not and cannot even be classified as a religion, while Islam is a
monotheistic creed; and that constitutes the core of Islamic resist
ance to communism.
Long before Marxism was written by German intellectuals, Karl
Marx and Erederich Ehgels, Islam was divinely imparted to an Arab, the
Prophet Mohammad.

Islam remains a potent dogma affecting the lives

of the majority of Iranians.

Die basic credo of Shiism is the pro

fession of belief in God and the acknowledgement that Mohammad has
been the prophet and Ali as the first legitimate imam.

Shiite Muslims
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in Iran also "believe in eleven other imams*

In Marxism, there is no

credit given to God, only to the authors of the doctrine, namely,
Marx and Engels.

Mankind is regarded as the exclusive change agent

over nature, according to Marxism, not any religious deity or surro
gates of the deity.
hr. Ali Shariati (1979) explained that another difference "between
Islam and Marxism is in trems of moral values.

Islam provides answers

for mankind about moral values, while Marxism has failed to solve the
problems of morality in society. Marxism is a general scientific theory
which adheres to the philosophy that society is a natural phenomenon
that develops according to natural factors and laws.

However, in Islam,

there is no distinction between religious laws and secular laws (Jansen,
1979)* Muslims are guaranteed, as enumerated in the Koran, the holy
book of Islam, specific rights and privileges in this world as well as
in a promised after-life.

In contrast, Marxism stresses atheistic

secular laws and behavioral guidelines for here-and-now.
The focus of Marxism is on specific classes in society-— the pro
letariat and bourgeoisie.

Eventually the proletariat will overcome

the repressive bourgeoisie and the society will become a classless
one. According to Dr. Ali Shariati (1979)» Islam recognizes annas-—
the masses— as the fundamental basis and conscious factor in determin
ing the course of history and society.

On the other hand, in Marxism a

social system is envisioned which ultimately evolves into a classless
society with production, distribution, and consumption equally dis
tributed and delegated to the masses.

The economic order in Islam
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is different.

All classes in the community of believers are obligated

to contribute specific amounts of income and property for sustaining
the operation of Islamic institutions.
Another common comparison made regarding the two ideologies is
in terms of the goals for both of them.

The paramount goal for both

doctrines is to gain liberation for their followers.

In Islam, the

liberation is a means to insure the continuation of their way of
life.

In Marxism, the liberation goal is different. With liberation,

it is expected that the workers will become strengthened in their
struggle to gain control of production, distribution, and governance.
Lenin, Stalin, and successive communist leaders envisioned the co
operation of communist parties throughout the East and the West,
committed to a worldwide revolution against non-communists (Eustow,
1965).
In Marxism, revolution will inevitably produce changes in the
social system.

In Islam, there is a phenomenon referred to as Jihad.

As Jansen (1979) pointed out, Jihad has been often described as Islamic
holy war; however, the Ehglish equivalent for the word Jihad is effort*
Abdalati (1975* P« 143) explained thats
War is not the objective of Islam, nor is it the normal
course for Muslims. It is only the last resort and is
used under the most extraordinary circumstances when all
other measures fail. Islam never tolerates aggression
from its own side or from any other side, nor does it
entertain aggressive wars or initiation of wars. Muslims
are commanded by God not to begin hostilities, or embark
on any acts of aggression, or violate any rights of others.
Islam also dictates that at the time Muslims need to fight
in the cause of God, they need to but not transgress the
limits.
Another factor to consider is the Islamic clergy.

Ibr many

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

decades, the Shiite clerics have played a crucial role in deterring
the spread of Marxism throughout Iran.

The Islamic leaders remain

intent as ever on preserving Islam in Iran— not Marxism.

At stake

in the rivalry between Islam and Marxism is the role of the Shiite
leaders in society. As long as Iranian Muslims maintain their belief
in Shiism, the Islamic leaders will have their support base for their
income, their esteem, and. power. With Marxism, the Islamic clerics
stand to lose everything including their lives.
Since the 1920's, Soviet communist propaganda has been trying
to discredit and intimidate the Islamic clergy hoping to alienate
the Iranian Muslims from the influential clergy.

The recurrent

themes in the communist propagada are condemnation of the clergy as
oppressors and parasites.

Despite communist propaganda, the Shiite

clerics have been instrumental in hindering Soviet efforts to
communize Iran.

Die Islamic clergy incited Muslims in Gilan province

and helped demolish the headquarters of the first Iranian Communist
Party in 1920.

In the late 1940's, the religious leaders played a

significant role in subverting the communist hold on Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan.

In 1953 the Iranian religious leaders also rallied

Muslims to prevent a communist coup in Iran.

Again in 1978, the

Shiite clergy used their clout in gaining political control from
the leftists.
As attested by historical evidence, the Islamic barrier to
communism has not been ephemeral. However, the Islamic resistance,
besides its ideological alienation to Marxism, has another aspect
worth mentioning.

Anti-communist proponents, especially from the
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United States, have encouraged and assisted the Islamic clergy to
stage a strong resistance against Soviet intervention within Iran.
Although not explicit in Western foreign policy, covert plans exist
and have been implemented to provide aid, financial as well as mili
tary, to help the Iranian Muslims counteract communist threats and
aggressive offensives within Iran.

Roosevelt (1979) reported that

the Islamic clergy were paid millions of U.S. dollars to stage large
pro-Shah demonstrations in 1953* Lenczowski (1980) points out that
President Carter dispatched General Huyser to Iran in 1978 to thwart
the Iranian military from conducting a military coup against the
Islamic leaders.
Ibreign powers such as the U.S., United Kingdom, West Germany,
Japan, Israel, and others have gambled on the ability of Islam to
resist communist influence in Iran. Whether Islam will, in the
future, be resilient against communism greatly depends upon whether
the orthodox Muslima in Iran can be mobilized against the communists
(Halpem, 1963)*
in Iran.

Islam faces very tough competition for followers

Die polemics between Islam and Marxism continue, as some

scholars and political analysts contend under the guise of Islamic
Marxism.
The Affinity Theory
Iran's geopolitical survival is inextricably linked to the fact
that Iranians have been proselytes to various foreign ideologies.
The affinity of Iranians for foreign ideas cannot be ascribed to
just one factor.

A wide spectrum of opinions have been formulated
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as to why foreign doctrines appeal to Iranians.

The apparent affinity

of Iranians for foreign ideologies has "been attributed, mainly, to
Iran’s geographic position.

Iran, sharing its borders with five

countries, is situated at the crossroads between the East and West,
in contact with different values and ideas.
Itypka (1968) contended that Iranian compliance to foreign ways
occurs because Iranians are a spiritually gifted race whose circum
stances and experiences with suffering, instability, uncertainty,
and disillusionment have conditioned them to be receptive to innova
tions and doctrines emanating from other countries.

Eanatics, re

formers, radicals, and heretics have found Iranians most eager and
willing to follow them and their causes.
Erom time immemorial up to the present date, Iranians have been
vulnerable to invasion and foreign rule. While compelled to convert
or perish, generations of Iranians survived by adopting to foreign
ways.

While doing so, they also managed to synthesize aspects of

foreign dogmas.

These Iranian syntheses developed into fundamental

ideas, values, and traditions of the Iranian culture.

Despite foreign

expectations that Iranians conform to, or, at least, imitate foreign
standards, Iranians have managed to preserve many of their pre-Islamic
and Islamic traditions intact.
Islam, more than any other foreign ideology, has had an inefface
able impact on socio-political and economic developments throughout
Iran. Although Iranians capitulated to previously converted groups—
Islamized Arabs, Turks, and Mongols— they, in turn, significantly aug
mented Islamic practices and teachings in accordance with Iranian needs
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and traditions*

Sbr five centuries now, Islam has served as the

perceptual screen for Iranians to appraise all other foreign
ideologies.
Iranian conversion to Islam is one of the hest examples of
Iranization of a foreign dogma.

In the seventh century A.D., when

Mohammad revealed the guidelines and laws for Muslims, he did not
expect Muslims to formulate any variations or make modifications
in Islam. However, in the sixteenth century when Shiism was declared
the official state religion in Iran, its practice had significantly
changed from what the majority of Arab Muslims followed.
Initially the new Arab credo was not popular in Iran.

At that

time, the majority of Iranians were devoted to various native reli
gions namely, Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism, and others. Moreover,
the attitude of Iranians was so negative toward Arabs for invading
their country.

Despite the ethnic animosity and resentment about

Arab domination, the dregs of the Iranian society— a small minority
of Iranians consisting of the oppressed poor, farm laborers, and
prisoners-of-war were attracted to Islam(Yon Grunebaum, 1970).
Their conversion was mainly a survival tactic.

By converting to

Islam, they avoided cruel religious persecution and the payment of
a special tax levied by the Arabs against infidels.

Gradually Islam

became a permanent and irreversible aspect of Iranian life serving
as a primary means to secure prestige and social eminence.
Iran remains the only country whose Muslim population nearly
all belong to the Shiah branch of Islam.
innovation.

Shiism is not an Iranian

It emerged as a rival religious-political sect to the
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Sunni branch during1the middle of the seventh century during the
internecine strife in the Islamic community over the issue of the
legitimate successor to the Prophet Mohammad.

The Shiites preferred

that Imam Ali be the legal leader since he was the first to convert
to Islam. When the warfare ensued over succession, the majority of
Shiite Muslims decided to ban together.

In 1501 during the reign

of the Safavid dynasty, Shiism was adopted as the official state
religion.

Iranians accepted the belief in Islam and twelve Imams

out of national interest (llyrop, 1978; Bulliet, 1979)*

Their shift

from Sunni to Shiism aligned them with ideas and beliefs more in
accordance with Iranian traditions and staved off Arab domination.
Traditionally, the Islamic clergy in Iran, the conservative
force throughout the country, has acted as the final judge and jury
regarding the acceptance and rejection of foreign doctrines.

The

top ranking governmental officials have been the gatekeepers showing
receptivity toward foreign ideologies which would facilitate their
goals and objectives, or showing hostility toward creeds which might
hinder their socio-political plans and ambitions.

The majority of

Iranians have been persuaded to adopt foreign ideology endorsed by
the leaders of the country. However, a minority of Iranians who
have dared to accept foreign dogmas by the Iranian authorities have
been renounced as traitors or pagans.
Since the 1920's communism has been one of the foreign ideologies
condemned as "illegal" in Iran.

Die Soviet communist leaders have

relentlessly tried to convince Iranians to abandon Islam and accept
the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

Despite the social stigma ascribed
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to Soviet communism, some Iranians have over the years joined groups,
organizations, guerrilla factions, or gatherings oriented toward
communism.

During the 1950's, nearly one percent of the Iranian popu

lation belonged to the Tudeh Party.

The Tudeh Party leaders were

staunch supporters of the Soviet policies.

Reportedly, when the Soviet

leaders itched in Moscow, the Tudeh Party organizers in Iran started
to scratch.

A common saying about the Tudeh Party iss whenever it

rained in Moscow, the Tudeh Party leaders in Iran wore their raincoats.
Iran's northern neighbor, the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republic, has not abandoned its geopolitical goal to gain control of
Iran and include it among its sphere of influence in the East.

As

Zixing (1981, p. 191) contends:
Iran appears destined for an experience with Marxism.
What form Marxism will take remains unclear, but there
is little doubt that one version or another will ulti
mately gain acceptability in the country.
Proponents of the Affinity Theory conclude that Islamic Marxism
is the most appealing form of socialism for Iranian intellectuals and
youths.

Islamic Marxism, according to the Affinity theorists, is a

unique form of socialism with Islam as its basis— a religio-political
philosophy as distinct from marxism and other forms of socialism.
The proponents do not dismiss the profound differences between Islam
and Marxism but rationalize the amalgam of both as a major coalescence
of the common themes and tenets.
Why is Marxism appealing to Iranian Muslims and non-Muslims?
Marxism is a contemporary socio-political theory which seems at
tractive to Iranians because it provides appealing answers to solve
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major modem problems.

As Halpem (1963» p. l6l) explained:

Muslims do not find it difficult to assent to Marx. . . .
In a society in which toil has never been thought to
be intrinsic to dignity or an instrumental value for
individual purification or salvation, Marxism offers
the utopia of satisfaction on the basis of need rather
than performance, stressing economic security primarily
as a means toward the achievement of human freedom.
Islamic Marxism is considered to be an Iranian innovation pos
tulated by militant Muslims who vehemently opposed the Shah's regime
in the early 1970's. Western scholars tend to trace the coalescence
of Islam and Marxism to the late 1930's.

In 1958, Lewis (1938, p.

312) enumerated similar tenets of the two doctrines:
Both groups profess a totalitarian doctrine with complete
and final answers to all questions on heaven and earth;
the answers are different in every respect, alike only
in their finality and completeness, and in the contrast
they offer with eternal questioning of Western man. Both
groups offer to their members and followers the agreeable
sensation of belonging to a community of believers, who
are always right, as against an outer world of unbelievers,
who are always wrong. Both offer exhilirating feelings
of mission, of purpose, of being engaged in a collective
adventure to accelerate the historical inevitable victory
of the truth over the infidel evil doer. The traditional
Islamic division of the world into the House of Islam and
the House of War, two necessary opposing groups, of which
the first has the collective obligation of perpetual
struggle against the second, also has obvious parallel
in the communist view of world affairs. There, again,
the content of belief is uttely different, but the aggres
sive fanaticism of the believers are the same.
Earis (1938) pointed out that Islam and communism are also
authoritarian— ^not democratic oriented doctrines which both proclaim
universality.

Each profess a certain mission to transcend their

homebase and unite followers throughout the world. Moreover, the
dominant appeal of communism for Iranian Muslims is due, in part,
to the predilection implicit in Lenin's teachings to oppose Western
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values and influences in Iran.
in 1965 , Said Mohsen and his cohorts who were formerly members
of the Liberation Movement of Iran along with Hanif Hejad established
a new guerrilla organization— the Organization of the Mojahedin of
the people of Iran.

The members of the organization held a common

belief that revolutionary violence in the form of armed resistance
was necessary to defeat the Pahlavi regime.

The Mojahedin axe con

sidered by their opponents to be the Islamic Marxists within Iran.
Their propaganda initially stressed that Islam was a progressive
ideology and a revolutionary one.

Besides the teachings of Islam,

they were familiar with the theories of Marxism and wanted to utilize
the practical aspects of Marxism and Leninism.

They tended to justify

their armed resistance, anti-imperialistic struggle, and recommendations
for a classless society by citing parallel passages in the Koran and
writings from Marx and Engels, and Lenin.
Ostensibly, Islam and Marxism are different ideologies in their
origins, formats, and contents.

Separately, each doctrine has been

misunderstood by Western analysts and leaders.

As an amalgam, the two

doctrines pose a new threat to Western policy makers.
Islamic Marxism is regarded as anti-Western.
stigma of being a leftist philosophy.

ELrts, the hybrid—

Belatedly, it has the

These factors alone alienate

adherents to Islamic Marxism from individuals oriented to Western
ideas and values.
Secondly, Islamic Marxism is militant as well as comprehensive.
The coalescence tolerates and promotes Islam as the superior religion
and incorporates the secular theories regarding collectivism, and
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solidarity of the masses against capitalism.
lav of the Koran undergirds Marxist theory.
Koran axe commonly known throughout Iran.

The supreme divine
'Dae guidelines of the

Islamic Marxism represents

a less threatening ideological shift than an abrupt shift from Islamic
ways to Vestem ones.
Thirdly, Islamic Marxism is a model of socialism native to Iran.
The appeal of a native ideology is far more credible than any imported
idea, at least, at the present juncture of Iranian history.

Although

Marxism was not formulated within Iran, as a non-Westem dogma its
acceptance seems to be justified. However, an ideological alignment
with the Soviet Union is considered a step toward communism.

Having

Iran within the communist bloc would significantly alter Western
influence in the Middle East and the rest of the world.
It is relevant to point out that political commentaries published
after 1979 rarely mention or use the term Islamic Marxism.

Instead

of Islamic Marxism, the contemporary synonym being used is "Islamic
left" or "left Islamic."

No longer are political scholars and

writers speculating about the potential affinity of Iranian Muslims
toward Marxism.

Political analysts nowadays (1982) do not dismiss

the affinity of Iranian Muslims for Marxism.

Iheir speculation

has shifted to analyzing and scrutinizing the impact which Islamic
Marxism will have in the revolutionary changes in the Iranian society.
The Scapegoat Theory
Proponents of the Scapegoat Theory contend that Islamic Marxism
was a propaganda scheme developed, financed, and supported by the
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Shah and his cohorts.

The Shah, certainly, had the power, authority

and means to wage extensive and effective propaganda campaigns to
maintain his power. Media coverage throughout the world promoted
his version of events in Iran, even his claims and accusations about
Islamic Marxism (Dorman & Omeed, 1979)*

He had access to the media

as well as plenary power to enforce strict censorship limiting in
formation which might cast his regime in any bad light.
Islamic Marxism, alleged foe of Iranians, ranked high on the
Shah's scapegoat list.

Scapegoating is regarded as a common strat

egy used for conflict management (Erost it Wilmot, 197&)*

A review

of the Shah's political behavior under stress substantiates that
he frequently resorted to exonerate himself by blaming others for
domestic and international problems (Hbveyda, 1979; Ledeen it Lewis,
1981).

Hy identifying various scapegoats, the Shah cleverly evaded

enmity and condemnation.

He merely diverted the public attention

onto others and gained supporters and sympathizers for his plans of
action.
The Shah turned to scapegoating as a means to save his face.
The maintenance of personal dignity is highly valued in the Iranian
society (Smith et al., 1978; Harris & Moran, 1979)*

Shoe-saving

or gheyrat or aberu is more a social custom rather than a religious
tradition among all segments of the population in Iran (Graham, 1979;
Deming it Harper, 1979)*

Scapegoating served the purpose of preserving

the Shah's dignity as ruler of Iran.
Why did the Shah promote propaganda about Islamic Marxism?
Halliday (1979) contended that the Shah maintained disdain for the
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Islamic clergy and. communists.

He perceived each faction as polit

icized forces undermining his efforts to modernize Iran and to make
Iran a dominant regional power in the Middle East.

Although the

Shah claimed to be a Shiite Muslim, he remained suspicious of the
Islamic clergy.

Long before the Shah assumed the monarchy, his father

left a legacy of limiting the Islamic clerical influence throughout
the country.

Reza Khan banned various religious practices such as

self-flagellation; females wearing a special veil known as the chador:
discouraged pilgrimages to Najaf and Karbala; and confiscated reli
gious incomes (Perez, 1978)*

While in power, Reza Khan also restricted

the influence of the religious courts.

He limited their control over

information by establishing and encouraging secular education through
out Iran.
Hoveyda(l979) pointed out that Reza Khan's son, the Shah, merely
continued his father's anti-clerical policies.

The Shah deliberately

approved programs and plans which would reduce the political, economic,
legal, and educational power control of the Islamic clergy.

Itor

example, in 1963, the Shah by royal proclamation ordered the re
apportionment of land owned by the clergy.

He also dictated changes

in calendar to undermine the dominance of the mullahs and ayatollahs
in the country.

The Islamic clergy were disturbed by the Shah's

actions, particularly, his reduction of their religious income and
over the allocation of extra-territorial rights which the Shah
granted to the U.S. for monitoring outposts (Halliday, 1979)*
Shah's orientation toward Western values and ideas was in stark
opposition to the traditional values promoted and adhered to by the
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Islamic clergy.
In. addition to the Islamic clergy, the Shah perceived the Soviet
and communists to "be hostile adversaries to his rule.

In the late

1940's the Shah claimed that he was the masternodnd in disbanding’
Soviet communist rebels from Iran.

To further deter communist influ

ence within the country, the Shah outlawed the Tudeh Party labeling
it as an illegal political party (Echo of Iran, 1977)*

He also estab

lished a special police force, the SAVAK, just to rid the country of
communist sympathizers, and their subversive activities.

luring his

reign, numerous communists were imprisoned, executed, tortured, or
exiled.

The Shah also permitted U.S. agents to spy on the Soviet Union

and on communists in Iran.
By expounding the belief that a coalition of Islam and Marxism
was threatening the stability of Iran, the Shah attempted to spread
fear among Iranians not to join or tolerate individuals who were Islamic
Marxists.

Using the adjective Islamic to modify Marxists, the Shah

tried to revive Muslim resentment against the communists (Moss, 1978)*
Iranian Muslims distrusted the communists and the Soviets for various
reasons.

Iranian Muslims detested the communists for the dissemination

of propaganda which was anti-religious and anti-clerical in context.
Besides the propaganda, Iranian Muslims were full of resentment over
the Soviet's shelling of their holy shrine in Mashad in early 1900's
(Hyrop, 1978).
By insinuating that Islamic Marxism was dangerous, the Shah
expected that the Islamic clergy would endorse his actions.

By using

the claim that Islamic Marxism was more dangerous to the Iranian
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establishment than simple Marxism, atheism, or organized religion,
the Shah wanted to provoke the trepidation Westerners had for any
form of communism in the free world*
Nyrop (1978) asserted that there was, in fact, no organization
or group in Iran having the name Islamic Marxist.

During the late

1970*s some guerrilla groups in Iran formulated ideological guide
lines which characterize Islamic Marxism; however, there were never
any claims that their ideologies were a pure version of Islamic
Marxism.

Throughout his reign, the Shah (1967? 1980) insisted that

Islamic Marxism was a particular religious-political hybrid— the holy
alliance of black and red evolving in Iran.

He considered Islamic

Marxism to be synonymous with terrorism.
According to the Shah (1980, p. 145)» Islamic Marxism is deeply
rooted in Iran’s conscious:
The black— the clergy— had opposed my father, and supported
my rule only sporadically. Religious fanatics who did not
understand the true nature of Islam had allied with the
Tudeh back in 1940's. Our investigation of my would be
assassin, Ihkhrarai in 1949» attested to this considera
tion. Mossadegh1s government demonstrated how such a
red-black alliance could thrive without a clear understand
ing by the non-communist members of its consequences. The
situation is different today.
The Shah (1980, p. 162) maintains that the recent amalgam of
Islam and Marxism resulted from:
Those prelates who naively put their hands on those of
militant atheists. The prelates are doomed in this
fatal alliance. They will leave their mark on history
only through crimes which they were forced to commit
and for which they took frightful responsibility in
the name of God. The tragedy is that religion will be
obliterated by militant atheism, in the name of the
Sovereign People and the Communist Gospel.
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It is noteworthy that the Shah was the most informed, and the
main source for all details about Islamic Marxism. More than any
other individual or group, the Shah reported the origin, the ideo
logical orientation, even the goals and objectives of Islamic Marx
ism in Iran. His sister Ashraf (1980, p. 113) agrees with the Shah
that Islamic Marxism was not a new phenomenon but "a political force
evolving in Iran over the past generations or gaining strength when
ever there was a period of disenchantment with the West." Neither
leading Iranian communists, Soviet communists, Shiite Muslims, nor
other political activists publicized news about Islamic Marxism.
On the other hand, it seemed that the Shah knew exactly what Islamic
Marxists were trying to do in Iran.

While it may seem redundant

to cite the Shah regarding information about Islamic Marxism, there
is no other alternative since he maintained the inside tract on
its origin, and activities.
There is no evidence to substantiate that the Shah actually
coined the word Islamic Marxism.

He never admitted that he devised

the expression Islamic Marxism for propaganda and strategic purposes.
In fact, the Shqh asserted that the Mojahedin disseminated it through
the country with the help of the mullahs.

The Shah (1980, p. 162)

alleged:
Nor the first time the slogans of Islamic Marxism were
trumpeted before large audiences. The Mujahedin—
saboteurs trained in Lebanon and Libya— took this surprising
theory to our naive masses who listened with interest
for the first time; the agitators now had the backing
of mullahs and thus the blessings of organized religion
for their proposterous statements.
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However, the Mojahedin members refate all charges that they are
leftists or Marxists.

They claim that they are a lay Islamic organiza

tion supporting progressive Shiism. Members of the Mojahedin consider
the label Islamic Marxist to be merely the Shah's verbal weapon to
denigrate their organization in Iran and abroad (People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran, 1978)*
There is evidence that the Shah conspired against the left and
his religious opponents.

At the Shah's insistance a controversial

article entitled, "Iran and the Red and Black Imperialism," was pub
lished in the January 7» 1978, edition of the Bttela'at newspaper.
The two column article included an expose against exiled Ayatollah
Khomeini and a discussion about a conspiracy instigated by a union
of Islamic leaders and Marxist groups to destroy Iran.
The publication of the article is regarded by many as one of
the Shah's catastrophic blunders which sparked the advent of the
Iranian Revolution (Rubin, 1980; Keddie, 1981; Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
The day after the article was featured in Iran, one of the bloodiest
demonstrations since 1963 took place in Qpm between theology students
and Iranian security forces.

Keddie (1981) asserts that the newspaper

attack decisively altered the anti-Shah protest movement by strengthen
ing the religious led opposition in Iran.
The Shah had called wolf so often during his reign that even
when he complained about Islamic Marxists, he did not gain the sub
stantial domestic or foreign support he needed.

He used Islamic

Marxists as his scapegoat at a time when the U.S. government leaders
did not have the political clout internationally nor sound foreign
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policy to keep the Shah in power (Alexander & Nanes, 1980).
Long after the Shah departed Iran, Islamic Marxism served as the
scapegoat for Ayatollah Khomeini.

The majority of Iranians and

foreigners remain skeptical about the amalgam of Islam and Marxism.
Proponents of the Scapegoat Theory, Hoveyda (1979)» Ealliday (1979)»
Ibrbis (1980), and others conclude that Islamic Marxism was a figment
of the Shah1s imagination which became an obsession of his during
the 1970*s.
The Infiltration Theory
Ibr some years now, it has been assumed that the Shah had created
the label Islamic Marxism as a publicity stunt to gain domestic and
international sympathy for his troubles.

If the Shah did not invent

Islamic Marxism, then who did and for what purpose?

To solve this

whodunit, Moss (1978) proposed that the Scapegoat Iheory is invalid.
Moreover, he contended that Islamic Marxism was a Soviet communist
invention.
Infiltration is not a new Soviet tactic to be used in Iran.

As

early as 1919 when Tran was selected as the first non-Westem country
to be communized, plans were devised in Soviet Russia to dispatch
communist agents to Iran to disseminate communist propaganda and to
help organize an Iranian communist party (Zabih, 1966).

These agents

made sure that there were sufficient untruths and rumors about the
British government's collaboration with the Iranian leaders.

The

ultimate goal was to stir up distrust and fear among Iranians.
During the 1920's the communist propaganda network was extensive
throughout Iran.

Soviet leaders trained their own agents to speak
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Persian and other native Iranian dialects in order to facilitate the
spread of communism within Iran*

In addition, a select number of

Iranians were also educated in the Soviet Union.

According to Zabith

(1966), Soviet leaders found it beneficial to offer Iraniana political
asylum as a means to gain Iranian sympathizers.
luring the 1950*3, the Soviet leaders changed their intervention
policy toward Iran.

Instead of using military force to subdue Iran

ians, the Soviet leaders resorted to diplomatic channels to win over
the Iranian masses (Kazemzadeh, 1974).

By 1953» Iran's largest

political party, the Tudeh Party was infiltrated with communist
agents from the Soviet Union (Cottam, 1979)*

Biese agents helped to

gain control of numerous newspapers, trade unions, and institutions
in Iran (ihtemi, 1980).

After the 1953 coup d'etat in Iran, much of

the communist activities went underground.

Despite the physical

risks, communist agents continued to help organize Iranians conduct
anti-Shah demonstrations and protests (Nyrop, 1979)*
By the late 1970's, the Soviet communists tried another tactic,
namely, Islamic Marxism.

Islamic Marxism was not the name of a local

base terrorist organization but a generic term used to describe a
new solidarity directed by the Soviet communists in Iran for defeating
the Shah.
As Moss (1978) related, the new communist tactic relied on the
credibility of the adjective Islamic among the Iranian masses.

The

new coalition of Islamic Marxism was envisioned as a strong political
force to deter Western domination and exploitation.

This new amalgam

deliberately had no central leadership or headquarters.

The main
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goal for the Soviet communists was to end Western influence and term
inate further dependency on Western aid.
the amalgam was promoted.

To accomplish this goal,

Eventually, the adjective Islamic would he

dropped and Marxism would become the exclusive ideology for the Iranian
masses (Moss, 1978)•
The Soviet leaders tested their new strategy of Islamic Marxism
in Iran.

As far as the Soviet leaders were concerned, Islamic Marxism

was the best way to establish communism in the Middle East (Moss, 1978).
KLrst of all, the new tactic was a progressive solution for Ifizslims
and communists.

This new tactic was carefully planned so that top

billing was given to Islam— the traditional ideology of the Iranian
population (Eabiby & Ghavidel, 1978).
guise to attract followers in Iran.

Secondly, Islam was a credible
Thirdly, Islamic Marxism focused

on common fears and hatred among the Iranian masses, particularly,
the concern that the Shah was selling the welfare of the Iranian people
to Western entrepreneurs and the Shah's repressive regime was being
fortified by the West.
Although the U.S. media reported news about Islamic Marxists, and
U.S. political leaders, scholars, and writers identified the alleged
group as a leftist organization, such rhetoric and print did little
to explain the Iranian enigma of Islamic Marxism.

Radio Moscow kept

reiterating during the late 1970's that Marxism and Islam were totally
compatible.
Proponents of the Infiltration Theory justify the takeover of
the Islamic faction from the Marxist faction as merely an intermediate
stage in the plan that the Soviet communist leaders have for Iran.
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First of all there is a need to view events of Soviet infiltration in
hoth regional and global contexts.

The Soviet willingness to assist

in covert and indirect ways is blunt and opportunistic.

Soviet policy

or rather style is to make denials of its involvement while it supplies
aid to pro-Soviet surrogates to assist them in activities to transform
conditions in Iran in directions favorable to Soviet influence.
Secondly, the proponents of the Infiltration Theory stress that
the Soviets capitalize on the growing discontent in Iran by manipulat
ing the perceptions of native Iranians with Islamic Marxism.

Along

with the Tudeh Party, Islamic Marxists were to augment pro-Soviet
support and guarantee the Soviet foothold in Iran.

The Soviet leaders

expected Islamic Marxism to be a self-fulfilling prophecy with Iranian
Muslims joining with the Marxists first to defeat the Shah, to severe
ties with the U.S. and then become an ally of the Soviet Union.

Is

lamic Marxism was to serve as a precedent in the Middle East region
to transform Iran and other countries in the area to the pro-Soviet
CSJQtp •

After experiencing the inadequacy of the Islamic clergy to sat
isfy and fulfill the needs of the Iranian society, the Soviet commun
ists would offer their assistance to Iran in the form of treaties;
then in aid to create a dependency relationship between the Soviet
Union and Iran.

By wearing the mask of Islam, the communists would

have a better chance of being accepted by the masses in Iran.
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Summary
Is Islamic Marxism a myth or a contemporary nemesis?

There are

various theories, the Barrier Theory, the Affinity Theory, the In
filtration Theory, and the Scapegoat Theory, to support either of the
two notions about Islamic Marxism.

Of all the theories, the Affinity

Theory comes'the closest in explaining that Muslims and Marxists share
some common contentions.

However, the Affinity Theory stops short of

crediting Iranians with syncretizing a viable contemporary ideology.
It is not surprising to find in the literature the mixed reaction
toward an Iranian based doctrine, considering that all other extant
theories about creation, evolution, revolution, and governance also
have their share of proponents and adversaries.

In Iran during the

late 1970's some Iranians who had studied Marxism and other political
theories formulated an avowed militant and progressive form of Shiism.
Their alternative ideology is still regarded as a leftist doctrine and
is even commonly referred to as Islamic Marxism.

Khomeini labeled this

type of Shiism as elteghati— a hybrid.
Islamic Marxism and elteghati are both inaccurate descriptions for
the credo advocated by the Mo.iahedi-e Khaigh.

Their ideology is based

on true Islam— progressive shiism— which is different from that of the
fundamentalists.

Very few writers or commentators have reviewed Tabiine

Jahan which serves as. the manifesto of the proponents of the Mo.iahedin
in Iran and abroad.

Instead, the rumors and allegations about Islamic

Marxism continue to be propagated by those opposing the influence of
the Mo.iahedin.
The Mo.iahedin in Iran and abroad are regarded as one of the
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Iranian extremists vying for power in Iran.

On one hand., the

Mo.lahed-in are discredited an leftists and radicals; yet, on the other
hand, the Mo.iahedin have been loyal to their ideology and commitment
to fight against oppression.

This organization has weathered the

critics who have accused them of being Islamic Marxists.
leaders have been executed) imprisoned, and tortured.

Their

To date, they

have not cooperated with Iranian Marxists or Soviet supporters.
Moreover, their armed defiance and attacks against Ayatollah Khomeini's
version of Shiism still arouses mixed reactions from critics and sup
porters.
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CHAPTER 1 7

COMMUNISM IN IRAN
Scope
The ma-in intent of this chapter is to provide an historicalcomparative analysis of communism in Iran from 1920 to 1982. Much
controversy exists about communism in lean.

Zabih (1966) suggested

that this confusion was due in part to the strict censorship policies
enacted in Iran.

Girling (1980) contends that this perplexity is due

to bias towards communism which dominates much of the available reports
and publications.
This case study will focus on the perceptions of Iranians, Amer
icans, and Russians about communism in Iran from 1920 to 1982. Have
the perceptions about communism in Iran changed?

If there has been

change, in what direction? What have been the effects of the percep
tions of Iranians on communism? With these questions in mind, an
essential starting point for this study is to analyze past and present
attitudes toward communism in Iran.
Perceptions about Soviet Communism in Iran
Throughout this thesis, the word "communism" will be used to refer
to doctrines and movements which claim to be derived from, the teachings
and political examples of Marx and Engels, and Lenin (Seton-Watson,
1977)*

Communism is not a distant phenomenon but an omnipresent one

for Iran.

Geographically the TJ.S.S.R* and Iran share a border together

56
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(McLane, 1973 )• Within Iran, some Iranians have been supporters of
Soviet communists, while other Iranians have favored communism hut
not an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Ihtemi (1980) contends that

the ultimate goal of the communist leaders in the Soviet Union has
been to gain control of power in Iran.

Erom the Soviet perspective,

Iran is likened symbolically to an apple which in due time will be
ripe for harvest (Troianowsky, 1957; Ihtemi, 1980; Chubin, 1981).
The Shah (1980, pp. 12-13) expresses the belief that:
In the forty years I had lived as neighbor to the masters
of the Kremlin, I had never seen any wavering of Russians
political objectives: A relentless striving toward world
domination. Moscow had time. It could wait fifty years,
accept a step or two backwards, deal, accommodate, but
never lose sight of its final aims.
Communism is a controversial topic which evokes various reactions
from Americans and Iranians.

There is a bipolarity in the attitudes

which Americans and Iranians have toward communism.

Initially U.S.

leaders decided that Soviet communists as well as all other forms of
communism are formidable adversaries which need to be stopped at all
costs.

U.S. foreign aid is especially ear-marked to fight against

Soviet communists and communists throughout the globe (Heravi, 1969;
Harrison, 1978; Alexander & Manes, 1980).
Official surveys providing information about Iranian public
opinions toward communism are rare.

Rogers and Sills (1958) reported

in their 1951 survey with Iranians that there is a distinct bipolarity
in the attitudes of Iranians with respect to communism.

In a recent

perusal of Iranian government literature, Iranian religious writings,
underground rhetoric and publications, and communist periodicals, two
viewpoints are dominant:

Anti-communist opinions and pro-communist
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opinions.
Ibr over half a century the rulers in Iran have never favored
adopting communist doctrines nor surrendering Iran's power to the
control of Soviet communists.

The Iranian ruling elite have widely

publicized and openly demonstrated their hostility toward communism.
As Cottam (1979) pointed out, negative sentiment toward Soviet com
munists and their Iranian supporters has been pervasive among the
vast majority of the people in Iran.
Various methods have been utilized by the Iranian rulers to
check the spread of communism within Iran.

Ibr example, Reza Shah

enacted Iran's first Anti-Communist Law in 1931*

Ibis law prohibited

all genuine disguised activities and propaganda which extolled com
munism.
In addition, subsequent Iranian rulers have exerted their plenary
powers to censor all information and events which they considered as
being communist and subversive to the Iranian regime.

Each Iranian

ruler has regarded it as a duty and mandatory responsibility to main
tain massive propaganda campaigns against communism.

Ayatollah

Khomeini (1980) also proposes that communists must be purged from Iran.
Despite the rhetoric, many Tudeh Party members and also one faction
of Eadaiyoon— Aksareyaet members still hold numerous governmental
positions.

The major reason for the assignment of positions to the

supporters of the above two groups is their support of the government
policies,
Halliday (1979) reported that special bureaucratic divisions
have been established by Iranian rulers to check all opposition to
the ruling clique.

As the Shah (i960, p. 158) recounts, the SAVAK,
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the organization for Information and State Security, was instituted
in Iran to combat communism subversion after 1956.

The current

Islamic government in power in the country has established the SAYAMA,
the National organization of Information and Security of Iran, to
regulate communist subversives and dissidents (The Iran Times. Sep
tember 8, 1973)*

Besides SAVAMA, the current regime in Iran uses

hezbollahi— -party of God— komiteh members— revolutionary committees,
nasdaran— revolutionary guards, basigi— mobilized units, and others.
Khomeini himself claims that a thirty-sir million member organization
exists in Iran to safeguard his interests and those of the mullahs.
Under the Shah a large budget was allocated to counteract any
opposition in Iran and curtail the communist influence within the
country.

Nyrop (1978) points out that an extensive public relations

campaign was initiated to extol the Shah’s achievements.

Consequently

during the 1960's, school books were re-written to emphasize the
accomplishments of Iranians, especially the "King of kings— the Shah
of Iran." Baraheni (1977) claimed that the Shah deliberately censored
all literary works which did not praise the monarchy.
The Shah himself was one of the foremost experts about communists
His books contain passages devoted to discussion about communists.
Ibr example, the Shah (1974* P« 162) pointed out that:
Communist dictators resemble fascist ones in that they
enjoy holding elections. They hope to give the ordinary
working man the idea that he has a voice in the govern
ment of their country. But the communist leader allows
only one political party; anybody who tries to start
another, or speaks against the ruling party is, likely
to be liquidated. In the elections (if you call them by
that name), the voter has no choice, for only candidates
listed are those of the ruling party. Purely as a
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matter of form, the citizen is urged or ordered to go
and vote; the authorities then triumphantly announce that,
let us say 99*9% of the votes cast, were for the ruling
party. I wonder how many intelligent people are fooled
by that sort of thing.
During the Shah's reign, he was never suspected of being a
communist agent or even pro-communist.
a one-party system.

However, he used to favor

He ordered all Iranians to become members of the

Rastakhiz or Resurgence Party, his own political party which he founded
in 1975 (Cottam, 1979).

Zonis (1971) commented, in Iranian elections

despite votes being cast, only the Shah's favorites were given power
positions in his government.

The Shah had mentioned that communist

dictators resorted to liquidating their opposition.

While in power,

the Shah himself tried to get rid of all his opponents.

Although there

are thousands of cases of human rights violations, the Sbah (1980)
asserts that the Iranians were never pursued or subject to police
arrest for their writings or rhetoric.
Despite laws, tortures, executions, intimidation tactics, various
individuals and organizations support communism in Iran.

Por several

decades, communism has been propagated through a legacy of martyrdom,
rhetoric, newspapers, underground literature, and by overt and covert
activities within the country and abroad.
The pro-communist and anti-communist sentiments in Iran cannot
be traced to just one factor or event.

Intense nationalism has been

prevalent in Iran long before there were communist activities in the
country.

Cottam (1979)» Halliday (1979)» "the Shah (1980), and Ihtemi

(1980) concur that Iranian rulers expressed negative sentiments
towards the Russian czars and feared being invaded.

This negative
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attitude was automatically transferred to Russian communists.

Initially,

Sultan Zade (1921), and Armajani (1972) concluded, there was consider
able disagreement among the communists whether Iran was actually ready
for revolution.
Heravi (1969) reports that the Russian communists were enthusiastic
about exporting communist ideology to Iran.

Much preliminary planning

went into their decision to first communize Iran.

Their major objective,

according to Zabih (1966), was to establish an extensive network of
communist parties throughout Asia.

These parties would be modeled after

the Russian communist party, and would, in fact, be guided by the cen
tral government in Russia.

The proposed strategies were to develop

international communism in the Asian countries as a strong defense
against capitalism.
Troianowsky (1918) and Lenczowski (1949) concur that the communists
intended to first incite a revolution in Iran "against foreign imperi
alism" while simultaneously "educating the laboring masses in the East"
that communism is a desirable ideology.

The Russian communists ulti

mately wanted the control of the warm water port— the Persian Gulf to
assume access over all of Asia.
Contemporary communist theoreticians like Chertikhin (1975) and
others stress that the chances for communist ideology to be accepted
in Iran greatly depends upon the ending of nationalist movements in
the country.

The Iranians have in the past shown propensity towards

communism because communism offers a strong alliance against further
capitalistic imperialism and its control.
As the Shah (1980) points out, the Persian communists and
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especially the Americans have preconceived, notions about what Iran
ought to be rather than what Iran really is.

The Shah (1980, p. 27)

makes the point that "comparing what happens in Iran to other nations
. . . is like comparing apples and oranges."

Sills (1968) concurred

that the reactions of Iranians to international communism is unique
in the Middle East, in that, national communism has been emerging
within Iran.

The term "national communism" is used in this context

to refer to indigenous forms of communism which have developed in
Iran but reject the control of Russia.

Iranian communists were attract

ed to the communist ideology that would free them from foreign imperi
alism but at the same time they did not want Russian hegemony either
(Lacqueur, 1956; Morris, 1959; and Shoup, 1962).
Perceptions About Iranian Nationalism
Integral to the study of communism in Iran is an analysis of
Iranian nationalism.

American and Iranian leaders tend to describe

Iranian nationalism in Orwellian terms.

George Orwell, the British

novelist, did not originally develop his classification for nation
alism based on circumstances in Iran.

Orwell (1953) initially iden

tified three types of British nationalism:

"positive" nationalism,

"negative" nationalism, and "transferred" nationalism.

According to

Cottam (1979)* Americans consider Iranian nationalism to be "negative"
nationalism.

Orwell (1953) proposed that "negative" nationalism

characteristically entails anglophobia, a hostility toward Britain.
Throughout the contemporary history of Iran, anglophobia has been
pervasive while at the writing of this thesis, xenophobia seems to be
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mainly predominant.
According to the Shah of Iran (1974)» "negative” nationalism was
the product of local traitors or outside powers.
Mossadegh, his opponent

The Shah considered

during the 1950’s, to have instigated

"negative" nationalism in Iran. Nirumand (1969, p. 92), an

Iranian

writer, perceived Mossadegh's so-called "negative" nationalism to he
the emanicipation of Iran from the tutelage and exploitation from
foreign powers with the accentuation on Iranian nationalistic feel
ings, and the Shah's alleged "positive" nationalism to he the type
of nationalism which re-instituted court ceremonies and re-awakened
support for the traditional role of the king in the Iranian society.
On the other hand, the Shah asserted that his efforts to develop
Iran exemplified "positive" nationalism (Cottam, 1979)*

As the

Shah(l974» P« 125) explained:
We daily become stronger and more properous; we are hullding
a new country, and at the same time, we are maintaining
the truest nationalist sentiments. . . . In its truest
form, nationalism can lead a country to greatness.
Contemporary Iranian leaders such as Khomeini, Bani Sadr, Hajai,
and others abandoned Orwellian terms in favor of equating Iranian
nationalism with freedom from foreign intervention in Iran's internal
and international relations (The Iran Times. October 26, 1980).
Harrison (1978) maintained that this perception is an Asian or Third
World version of nationalism which focuses on terminating foreign
interdependence and involvement.

In addition, the current Iranian

ruling clique advocate Islamic unity as a means to end the control of
foreign influence in Iran (ihlk, 1979)*
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Communists have mixed opinions about nationalism in Iran.

Ibr

example, Marx and Ehgels (1897) proposed that nationalism throughout
the world was the tool of the bourgeoisie used to insure their ex
istence and control.

In the case of Iran, Lenin (1919/1957) decided

that Iranian nationalism was a vital catalysts to speed up the dia
lectical process against the overthrow of feudalism and the imperial
istic stage of capitalism.

By Infiltrating the national movements

in Iran, the communists hoped to shift the revolutionary struggle
from the national level to a social and class level fight.

As

Harrison (1978) explained, such strategy is commonly referred to as
"subnationalism.¥
Sills (1968) and Seton-Watson (1977) wrote that the Soviets had
a dna.1 approach to nationalism— on one hand they wanted to use it for
their own ends, but also on the other hand, they had fear of being
used by the nationalists.

Later communist ideology indicated that

nationalism was a force to be eliminated before communization would
succeed (Chertikhin, 1975)*
Jazani (1978), an Iranian, pointed out, Iranian nationalism
remains a considerable force much underestimated by foreign powers.
This force, he contended, resulted from the suffering from the
effects of foreign imperialism and the suffering from the effects
of economic, political, cultural, and religious oppression imposed
by Iran’s ruling clique.

Sills (1968) observed that no ideological

amalgam actually took hold among the majority of Iranian nationalists
and the communists.

Cottam (1979) stated that Iranian nationalists

recognized the contradiction between international communism and
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Iranian nationalism.

Die Iranian nationalists discerned, no difference

between foreign imperialism and Russian hegemony.
The Ripening Experiments
The Russian communists' efforts to communize Iran are all con
sidered as failures.

Sultan Zade (1921) and Zabih (1966) attributed

the fiascos to the Soviets' miscalculation about Iranian nationalism.
The Russians had expected the various Iranian nationalist movements
to be receptive to communist support, later receptive to communist
ideology and control.

The communists did not anticipate the weaknesses

of Iranian nationalism (Seton-Watson, 1977)*
As the Shah (1980, p. 12) observes the Soviets have had a great
desire to dominate Iran.

Although Iran did not have optimum condi

tions for communism, Lenin and other communist leaders selected their
neighbor Iran as the first Eastern country to have communism (Zabih,

1966).
Lenin (1997) appraised Iran as a weak, semi-colonial nation in
the feudal stage of development being exploited by Western capitalists.
Respite these apparent shortcomings, the Russian communists unrelentlessly pursued Iranians to join them.

Eatemi (1980) comments, the

communists decided that the seeds of communism with careful cultiva
tion would produce a good harvest of revolutionary spirit in lean.
Much preliminary planning went into the first communist offensive
in Iran.

Sultan Zade (1921) reported that international conferences

were held to plot strategies and decide what to do about Iranian
nationalism.

Zabih (1966) pointed out, a special branch of the
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Department of International Propaganda for Eastern Peoples was estab
lished to prepare materials in the Persian language to he disseminated
among Iranians.
Soon after the terms of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 were
known, the J a n p a l i s . those who were working with Marza Kuchek
Khan Jangali, organized a local nationalist group of Kurds to resist
against the establishment of a British protectorate in Iran. Mirza
Kuchek Khan, a former theology student and landowner, became the
leader of the nationalist movement in the Gilan Province of Iran.
Armajani (1972) reported that the supporters of Mirza Kuchek Khan vowed
not to shave or cut their hair until foreign troops had withdrawn from
Iran.

Cottam (1979) related that they also threatened the central

government of Iran that inhabitants of the Gilan Province would secede
from Iran if the British were permitted to stay in their country.
Ehsanollah Khan, a follower of Mirza Kuchek Khan, convinced him
not to attack the Russians when they entered Iran to chase the British.
After the Russian army chased the British from Baku, they stationed
themselves in Gilan— a province in the northern part of Iran.

Besides

the military presence in Iran, Soviet communists infiltrated the local
Iranian political organization known as the Edalat (Adalat) Party.
In 1920 the Edalat Party formally changed its name to Hezb-e Komonist-e
Iran (The Iranian Communist Party) with Benin as its honorary chair
man (Kambakhsh, 1972).
Shortly after the name change, The Iranian Communist Party began
to distribute anti-religious propaganda.

The communist agents had

anticipated that Muslims in Iran would revolt against Islam and
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the clerics.

The communist agents did not expect their anti-religious

campaigns to back-fire and antagonize the Iranians as it did.
Beza Khan crushed the Gilan rebellion.
Iranian territory without any explanation.

Bed Army withdrew from
The Iranian Communist

Party and the Jangalis left without any support.

It was then that

Beza Khan ordered the destruction of the Iranian Communist Party
headquarters (Zabih, 1966). Thereafter Iranians grew more suspicious
of the Russian communists.
After the Gilan fiasco, the communists did not abandon their goal
to communize Iran.

Ibr a decade, much of their efforts were subtle

in the form of disguised groups and organizations.

Zabih (1966)

pointed out, sports clubs, poetry groups, trade unions, and other
organizations were established to disseminate information about the
communism ideology. As soon as Beza Shah detectedrsuch activities,
he enacted the Anti-Communist Law in 1931 (Bavandi, 1944)*
Qhe second communist attempt to communize Iran was not the
brain child of the Bussian communist leaders.

Ihtemi (i960) explained

that Dr. Taghi Arani studied Marxism while living in Berlin.

Upon

returning to Iran, he and other Iranians organized the "Arani Circle"
for the expressed purpose of studying the teachings of Marx and Ehgels.
The "Arani Circle" published a journal entitled Donya(The World)
which featured discussions about Marxism in Persian (Abrahamian,
1970).
In 1937 all members of the Arani Circle were imprisoned for
violating the Anti-Communist Law.

The survivors of the Arani Circle

later organized the Eezbe Tudeh or the Mass Party in 1941 (Halliday,
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1979)*

By 1943 the Tudeh Party had developed into a highly structured

nationwide political party.

Initially the Tudeh Party avoided mention

ing its affiliation with communism or the Soviet Union.

However, the

top governmental officials did not hesitate to discuss publically the
affiliation of the Tudeh Party.

The Shah (1980, p. 73) remarks that:

Moscow helped found the Iranian branch of the communist
party, the Tudeh. I say."helped found" because the
British had a hand here, too, however difficult that
fact may be for naive people to believe. An employee of
the AngLo-Iranian Oil Company and a known British agent,
Mustafa Ihteh, financed the Tudeh newspaper, Mardom
(The People). Media ownership, of course, is crucial
to any fledgling party's political success and Tudeh
was no exception.
latemi (1980) claims that the Tudeh Party became the strongest
in the northern regions of Iran where the Tudeh hierarchy was more
influential than the officials of the Iranian central government.
During the late 1940‘s, th Tudeh Party had an extensive network of
supporters

in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Gilan.

Even the Soviets

made it clear that no government officials would be given permission
in the north unless they were supporters of the Tudeh Party (Kazemzadeh, 1974)*
As a political party, the Tudeh members had parliamentary priv
ileges to support the Soviet goals (Cottam, 1979)*

The Tudeh Party

included a number of nationalists who were involved in the party's
activities (Armajani, 1972; Ihtemi, 1980).

The Tudeh Party was

organized similarly to the communist party model with a central
executive committee, a platform of labor legislation, social insurance,
trade unionism, free education, distribution of land, rights of mi
norities, disarmament of tribes, and equality in the courts.

Zabih

(1966) pointed out that the Tudeh Party did not advocate nationalization
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of any property.
The Tudeh Party slogan was:
all" (Armajani, 1972, p. 153)•

"Bread, health, and education for
The objectives of the Tudeh Party

were cited in their newspaper Bahbar (December 16, 1944) as follows:
Our fight against the ruling class will be relentless
and continuous. This corrupt and decayed structure must
be destroyed. Any government which fights our movement
is fascist and must be eliminated. Any group which
obstructs real cooperation between Iran and the Soviet
Union is a lackey of British imperialism and the foe
of the Iranian people. The present ruling groups are
holdovers of the Beza Shah regime and friends of the
imperial embassies, the masses should unite to bring
about their liquidation.
The Tudeh Party Programs had mass appeal throughout the country
(Cottam, 1979).

Twenty editors joined together to promote the Tudeh

Party's credibility and its propaganda.
only means to communize Iran.

The Tudeh Party was not the

For example, the Bussian communists

decided to back national movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.

The

Shah (1980) points out, the British suggested to Stalin to accept the
autonomy of the Iranian provinces but Stalin refused this offer.
After World War II the Bed Army was to evacuate from Iranian
territory but did not.

The Bussian leaders ignored Iran's appeals

to withdraw the Bussian troops.

However, the Bed Army advanced into

Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and established the Peoples' Bepublic of
Kurdestan and the Soviet Bepublic of Azerbaijan (Abrahamian, 1970).
Armajani (1972) explained that by 1945 the Demokrat Party under
the leadership of Fishevari replaced the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan.
The Tudeh Party continued to recruit members and expand in other
regions of Iran.

The Soviet leaders were counting on the two political

parties in Iran to help achieve Soviet goals and plans for Iran.
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For example, in the case of oil rights for Russia within the Iranian
territory, members of the Tudeh Party and supporters of the Demokrat
Party staged demonstrations and protests in Iran to persuade Iranian
leaders to grant oil concessions to Soviet leaders.
Hr. Mossadegh proposed a piece of legislation which prohibited
any oil concessions to foreign governments while foreign troops
were occupying Iranian territory.
situation in Iran,

This legislation complicated the

The Shah (1980) claims that he took a chance to

confront the Red Army in northern Iran, and his gamble paid off.
Before the Iranian troops started combat, the Red Army withdrew from
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan (Zabih, 1966). Avery (1965) and Arfa (1964)
reported that the Tudeh Party headquarters were raided and members
disbanded.

In 1947 the Tudeh Central Committee voluntarily relinquished

its powers and confessed its errors.

The Tudeh Party lost its member

ship and its mass popularity because it backed the Russians, and it
also lost its powers (Cottam, 1979)*
As the Shah (i960, p. 77) contends:
His military intervention prevented the second attempt in
the 20th century to erase Iran from the map of the world.
What the communists did in Azerbaijan was truly a ’landmark’
in Middle East history. The threat of communist imperial
ism was first clearly drawn in Iran. It was in the course
of the Azarbaijan chaos that the IT.S. for the first time
in history began to play a leading role in the Middle East.
Cottam (1979) mentioned that Reza Shah and his son considered
themselves to exemplify nationalism but, in fact, both never were
able to project to the Iranian people credible images as nationalists.
Since the Iranian rulers were unable to command the allegiance of the
Iranian people with nationalistic fervor, they traditionally utilized
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repressive and. autocratic means to maintain Iranian support for the
regime's policies.

Armajani (1972) speculated, the Pahlavi rulers,

either by "instinct" or "osmosis" had grasped the central message
of Western nationalism, namely that whatever is good for the state
is good for the people, rather than vice versa.
Anti-communist activities remained unrestrained in Iran.

How

ever, as Winder and Kritzeck (i960) related efforts were instituted
to thwart the spread of communism in Iran.

They maintained that

the Society for the Propagation of Islam, a British supported organi
zation functioned until 1953 disseminating tenets of Islam via daily
broadcasts on the government radio, provided classes at the theology
school at Tehran University and distributed anti-communist literature.
Armajani (1972) discussed another right wing, pro-British, anti
communist group called Brade-ye Melli or National will.

In 1944

Tabatabai, who had been exiled from Iran, had used British support to
organize a group known as the National Will.

Specifically the

members of the National Will advocated strong defences of the
political and economic independence of Iran and a foreign policy of
eternal neutrality for the country (Lenczowski, 1949)*
Other groups emerged during the chaos in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.
On the right were groups religiously oriented such as the Bedaiyan-e
Islam under the leadership of Nawab Safavi and the Mo.iahedin-e Islam
or Warriors of Islam led by Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani who strongly
opposed communist activities in Iran.

The Pan-Iranist Party, a

non-religious group, had the reputation of being a fascist organiza
tion (Armajani, 1972).
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A well organized leftist organization was the Tudeh Party which
re-established itself after the oil concession rights for the Soviets.
Khalil Maleki left the Tudeh Party and started his own group, known as
the Third Ibrce which was Marxist oriented but not aligned with Stalin.
Dr. Mbzaffar Baqai also founded the Toiler’s Party which vacillated
between Marxist and non-Marxist teachings. Allahyar Saleh, a former
minister of finance, organized members of the Iran Party to campaign
for changes in Iran (Cottam, 1979)*
On Pebruary 6, 1949 "the Shah officially decreed that the Tudeh
Party in Iran was illegal.

His action resulted from the evidence

collected by his security agents that the Tudeh Party may have helped
to plot his assassination.

Despite the royal decree, the Tudeh Party

continued its activities in Iran.

Dr. Mossadegh, who served as the

Shah's Prime Minister, did not enforce the Shah's decree against the
Tudeh Party. However, there was method to Dr. Mossadegh* s madness in
using the Tudeh Party as a ploy to attract the interest of U.S. leaders
to come to the aid of Iran and help deter the spread of communism there
(Cottam, 1979).
Dr. Mossadegh's plans to sustain power in Iran were never fulfilled.
The Shah instigated other arrangements with U.S. officials to over
throw Dr. Mossadegh in 1953*

in the midst of the chaos in Tehran,

Tudeh Party members staged massive demonstrations.

The CIA agents

dispatched to Iran organized a counterrevolutionary faction consisting
of paid Iranians to stage pro-Shah protests.

The Bed Army did not

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

come to the aid of the Tudeh members.

Instead, the Soviet government

decided to conduct business with the Shah as if nothing had happened.
Iranian-Soviet relations have fluctuated since 1955? however, the
Soviet leaders have tended to maintain a non-interference policy in
dealing with the rulers in Iran.
In 1978 when Iranians took part in massive street demonstrations
and resistance efforts, the Marxist groups in Iran were not leading
the uprisings in the country.

Ealliday (1979) concluded that there

was no strong communist coalition backing the overthrow of the Shah.
Guerrilla groups as the Mbjahedin, the Liberation Movement, and
Pedaeyoon guerrillas were actively involved throughout the pre-re
volutionary period, during the revolution, and in post-revolutionary
times.
At the top of the Islamic government list of infidels and enemies
of Iran are Americans, Iraqis, the Mojahedin, and leftist groups in
Iran which do not support Ayatollah Khomeini's plans and policies.
The Tudeh Party members and the Aksaereyaet have shifted their full
support to the clerics in power.

In 1983 another chapter will be added to Iran's history.

Vftiat

will be Included in that chapter of post-revolutionary Iran and the
struggle for power will depend in part upon the pervasive mood of the
Iranian masses toward Soviet communists or other forms of communism.
Summary
Iranian bipolarity toward Soviet communism has served as an
Iranian survival tactic for over sixty years.

Especially when
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Iranian rulers have perceived that their political opponents are
undermining their efforts or plans, or those times when the Soviet
leaders axe strengthening their hold in Iran, Iranian rulers have
stressed the evils of communism and imposed strict sanctions against
communist supporters in Iran*
Iran's anti-communist position has also facilitated trade and
diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other Western powers which
also oppose the spread of communism*

However, when the U.S. and

its allies imposed sanctions against Iran, Iranian rulers made deals
with the Soviets.

As is the case in post-revolutionary Iran,

Ayatollah Khomeini has completed numerous trade agreements with the
Soviets and other communist aligned countries.

KGB specialists have

"been invited to train SAYAMA and help set up a top-notch security
system throughout Iran*
In conclusion, Soviet leaders have not altered their plans in
1982 to exclude Iran from the oommunist bloc*
seems to he an on-going process.

The ripening of Iran

At the same time, the Shiite clerics

in Iran axe not instigating any short or long range plans to convert
to communism or make an alliance pact with Soviet leaders*

Future

events in post-revolutionaxy Iran will determine whether the majority
of Iranians will maintain or change their perceptions about Soviet
communism.
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CHAPTER V

POST-REVOLUTIONARY POWER PROGNOSES
Scope
Nearly all of the Western scholars, political analysts, writers,
and some Iranians who have written hooks, articles, and commentaries
about the recent revolution and its aftermath include some prognostica
tions regarding the power straggle in Iran in their works. A perusal
of the available publications reveals that there is no concensus among
the writers about the future prospects for power in post-revolutionary
Iran.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analytical review

of some of the major predictions about the future struggles for power
in Iran.
Prognosis: The Old
One of the most common prognoses found in the contemporary lit
erature and reports is that the power struggle will end in Iran.
Numerous versions have been proposed describing how the power struggle
will end.

Nor example, Chubin (1980) suggests that there will be a

slow collapse of the Islamic regime, primarily, from its own weakness
rather then from any direct challenges.

Bill (1981) contends that the

end to the power struggle in Iran will come when the extremists b u m
themselves out and enough Iranians become repulsed by conditions in
the country.

Rouleau (i960) foresees the termination of Iran's internal

power strife followed by a lengthy, major civil war.
As of April, 1982 there has been no relevant changes in the power
75
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hold in Iran.

Ayatollah Khomeini remains the faqih. Mo.itahed or

iTnam» however it is evident that his popularity and support among the
Iranian masses is seriously waning (Houleau, 1980; Ledeen & Lewis,
1981; Bill, 1982).
Prognosis:

New Leader for Iran

Not only do Iranians and others anticipate an end to the revolu
tion hut they also maintain a common belief that a leader will emerge
to save Iranians and restore the country.

Shiite Muslims expect that

Imam Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam who disappeared in the ninth century, will

rescue the country (Porbis, 1980).

However, monarchists living in exile

are hopeful that the Shah's oldest son, Reza Shah II will become the
leader of the country.

There certainly is sufficient propaganda avail

able extolling the Eahlavi successor as being willing and capable of
assuming power in Iran and upholding a constitutional government in
the country.

However the chances of reviving the monarchy in Iran

seem very remote.
Other nationalists favor different nominations for leadership
in Iran.

Bakhtiar, Madani, Bani Sadr, and some others are among the

nominees.

However, there is serious doubt among the people in Iran

that these exiled leaders will ever rule the country.

There is growing

sentiment that the exiled Iranians are plotting with foreign govern
ments to compromise Iran's power ( Madonee, 1982).
Ayatollah Khomeini expects a council to assume the power in the
country when he succombs.

One gets the impression from the newspapers

in Iran that the Shiite clerics are best qualified to take over the power
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controls.

The opposition press reports present a different story about

the anarchy and tension within the country.

Iranian jails and prisons

are full as well as the cementries.
Humors continue to circulate that the aged religious ruler in
Iran is ill.

On March 23, 1982, on a newsbroadcast, Prank Reynolds

of ABC reported that Ayatollah Khomeini was not dead.

A few seconds

of that particular broadcast were devoted to coverage of a recent
appearance of the Ayatollah.
When Ayatollah Khomeini dies or decides to give up his power in
Iran, James Bill (1981) contends that an "Iranian strong man" will
come to power.

The various prognosticators agree that the new

leader in Iran will be strong, but they do not venture to identify
him.
Prognosis: Mo.iahedin
Another popular prognosis regarding Iran's power is aptly
described by Mr. Chubin (1980, p. 25):
Die left stand only to benefit from the failures of the
present regime. . . .If the government falters, there
fore, it will be there to pick up the pieces. . .within
the left, the Mojahedin is the most likely contenders
for power. It combines the right ingredients— revolu
tionary credentials and the acceptable face of Islam.
The Mojahedin may emerge as the group most likely to
bring stability and order to Iran.
Prior to the revolution and even during the post-revolutionary
period, the Mojahedin Oranization in Iran and abroad have claimed
that they have solutions and plans for Iran.
plans as democratic and Islamic.

They describe their

However, the leaders of the

Mojahedin report that they are planning a new revolution in Iran,
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not for the sole purpose of struggling for power in Iran.

The Mojahedin

leadership contend that their ultimate goal is to put an end to oppres
sion and establish a democratic Islamic republic in their homeland—
Iran.
In 1982, the Mojahedin continue to promise that the new revolution
will take place soon. According to the Mojahedin leadership, the
Khomeini's regime will collapse in 1982 unless either a miracle happens,
or a foreign power interferes in the internal affairs of Iran to save
the current regime from its inevitable downfall.
Prognosis:

Communism in Iran

Communism in Iran is not a new phenomenon.

Iranian rulers have

adopted an anti-communist stance and enacted measures to thwart the
spread of communism in Iran.

Iranian leaders have tried to keep the

majority of Iranians ignorant about communist ideology, or, at least,
hostile toward the communists,

Undergirding the convictions of the

Iranian rulers is the belief that if communism is kept out of sight
or detestable, it would stay out of the minds of Iranians.

To this

end, the Iranian ruling elite has enforced strict censorship to pre
vent the dissemination of communist propaganda within Iran.

Baraheni

(1977) claimed that all Iranian writers and poets, classical and con
temporary, whose works did not e^tol or please the rulers of Iran,
have been banned throughout the country and kept from public circula
tion.

Consequently, the publication void has been filled by government

sanctioned materials containing Islamic and anti-communist themes.
Besides controlling the print media, the Iranian rulers have
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used, the government-owned television and radio to convey their anti
communist and anti-Mojahedin messages.

Regularly scheduled programs

have been pre-empted so Iranians can be educated about what the
Khomeini regime has labeled "elteghati11— -a hybrid in reference to
the ideology of Mojahedin.

Imitating his predecessor,Ayatollah Khomeini

has been accusing the Mojahedin of not having just an Islamic ideology.
Prime-time programs have been devoted to instruct Iranians about their
Islamic duty to report communists along with idle supporters of the

Mojahedin to authorities.

In addition, telephone calls and correspond

ence are regularly being monitored in Iran.
The Iranian rulers have also tried to hamper the development of
revolutionary unity and consciouness deemed so crucial for Soviet
communism by intentionally reducing the numbers of known Iranian
communists.

Reza Khan set the legal precedent by having Iran's first

anti-communist law drafted in 1931* Hiis law which prohibited all
political organizations from engaging in any communist activities and
propaganda served for many years as the legal basis for Iranian ruling
elites to get rid of communists as well as opponents to the Iranian
government.
Perhaps the most popular and expedient reduction tactic condoned
by the Iranian ruling elite has been physical annihilation of alleged
Iranian communists and Mojahedin supporters without due process.
Numerous Iranians, young, old, males, females, pregnant women, true
communists as well as non-communists have been summarily executed.
Other Iranians suspected of communist affiliation have been imprisoned
or exiled from the country as part of the government efforts to rid
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the nation of communists.
A perusal of published, statistics reveals significant inconsis
tencies in the number of anti and pro-communists in Iran.

The official

claim is that the anti-communists far outnumber the pro-communists.
Likewise, the various communist organizations in Iran also tend to
overestimate the number of their rank and file (Nyrop, 1978).
It is relevant to point out that the Iranian masses do not make
any distinctions between communism and the Soviets (Chubin, 1980).
Some leftist groups in Iran maintain links with communists in other
countries such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the South Yemen.
The leadership of the different leftist groups make the distinction
about their specific alignments; however, the majority of Iranian
laymen do not differentiate the communists from the Soviets.
The Iranian antipathy toward communism has, in part, delayed Iran's
ripening for communism.

Ibr decades, the Iranian ruling elite have

managed to keep the majority of Iranians fearful and suspicious of
Soviet communists and their plans to invade and dominate Iran.

It

has been the policy of rulers in Iran to rely upon physical force to
deter communist influence throughout the country.

To this end, billions

of dollars have been spent to purchase sophisticated weapons from abroad
as a means to ward off Soviet invasion.

During the Shah's reign, Iran's

military ranked as one of the more sophisticated in the world (Graham,

1979? Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).
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Prognosis: Soviet Involvement

It is no secret that the Soviet leaders have "been interested in
more than Iranian oil and natural gas.

Iran is strategically signifi

cant "because it commands the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf (Ball,
1980; Lenczowski, 1980; Chuhin, 1980; Ledeen & Lewis, 1981).

Instead

of initiating an invasion into Iran, the Soviets have supplied food
stuff, military aid, and technical assistance to the Khomeini regime.
The Soviet leaders are also providing aid to Iraq, Iran's adversary,
"based on agreements signed before the start of the war between Iran
and Iraq.

Iran would represent a strategic prize for Soviet Bussia.

Despite

the deep-seated anti-communist sentiment prevasive throughout Iran,
Ayatollah Khomeini is reviewing additional contracts and treaties with
the Soviets.

Despite the Soviet support of the present regime, Iran

ians still remain suspicious of the Soviet Union and its intentions.
Since 1979 a popular slogan chanted by Iranians has been:

"Neither

Past nor Vest."
Keddie (1981) contends that Western political leaders and writers
have been using the prognosis about Soviets taking control of power
in Iran as a pretext to justify their own plans for the region.

It

is relevant to mention that U.S. propaganda about Iran being in the
throes of the Soviets is not a new theme.

Yet, many writers tend to

agree with Dr. Lawrence Ziring's contention that the Soviets are active
ly involved in Iran.

If the Khomeini's regime collapses and the left-

ists-the Tudeh and Aksaereyaet coalition— take over in Iran, they will
ask for assistance from the Soviet Union.

If there is direct Soviet

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

military involvement in Iran, the U.S. will probably retaliate using
its Badid. Deployment Force and may possibly get involved in a limited
nuclear war.

Such conflict between the two super powers would most

likely develop into World War III (Molander, 1982),
Summary

There are a variety of prognoses about the struggle for power in
Iran.

One can find little optimism among the various prognosticators

regarding Iran's future prospects with or without Khomeini.
Conclusion
The contemporary struggle for power in Iran is a complex and
highly significant political dilemma for the country.

Further descrip

tive research is warranted about the various factions vying for power
in Iran.

Presently each of the opposition groups is circulating pub

lications hoping to recruit members and establish clout in the inter
national community promoting their ideology as the best for Iran.

As

more material becomes available, political analysts, writers, and
scholars will be able to gain more insight into the contemporary strug
gle for power in Iran.
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Iranian Opposition lections

Adalat Party
4,
Hezbeh Komuniste Iran (Iranian Communist Party;
1920-IIarxLst, Pro-Soviet Union
Erani Circle
Taghi Erani
Hezbeh Tudeh Party (Fass Party)
..1941Marxist, Pro-Soviet
Jazemi Groua

Sbt ob (aird

Democratic Party

1952-Titciet, Anti-Soviet

Ahmadzadeh Group

Pro-Soviet

.

’Tazman-e Cherikhaye Fedaeyoon Khalq
Ashraf C r o u o ^ 1970-Armed Straggle

S

Ashraf
Dehghani
Group

^ -- 1
Aksaeraet

TAgalleyaet

llezhat-e Azadi-ye Iran
Sazjnan-e Mo jehadin-e Khalq
Peykar
OTHER GROUPS
Saezmaendgan

Roushanfekran

Kumeleh

Zaehmaet Keshane
Kurdestan

Jonbeshe Daneshjuyane Pishgam
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NOTE
Note 1.

The terms Islamic Marxism and. Islamic Marxists are used

interchangeably*

The classification for the theories about Islamic

Marxism originated with the writer of this thesis.
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